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THE U-2 IN FLIGHT

John Bryson

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

THE NATION Cold-War Candor

"It is certainly no secret," said the State Department last week, "that, given the state of the world today, intelligence collection activities are practiced by all countries . . . The necessity for such activities as measures for legitimate national defense is enhanced by the excessive secrecy practiced by the Soviet Union in contrast to the free world."

With historic frankness, the statement went on to admit that "endeavoring to obtain information now concealed behind the Iron Curtain," an unarmed U.S. plane had flown over Soviet territory. Thus the U.S. told the world that a Lockheed U-2 brought down over Russia on May 1 was flying an intelligence mission, just as Premier Nikita Khrushchev said.

That admission stirred up a flurry of concern at home and abroad over the U.S.'s "embarrassment." The admission was embarrassing to the U.S. for one reason: it reversed the Administration's earlier claim that the U.S. was engaged in high-altitude meteorological research over Turkey and the plane drifted into Russia by mistake.

Open Skies. All the bored calm with which the world awaited an unproductive summit vanished in a new preoccupation: Would Khrushchev make use of his capture of the U.S. high-flying plane either to scuttle the summit or make unreasonable demands? Would allies be dismayed and neutrals angered?

The apprehensions, as they so often are, were exaggerated. The incident, coupled with Khrushchev's recent intransigence, has certainly heated up the cold war. But

people everywhere have accepted the reality of the cold war, which has its own kinds of maneuvers, battles, tactics and weapons.

Faced with the unexpected, the State Department, after its manly candor, set out to make its own points about the U-2.

"One of the things creating tension in the world today," it said, "is apprehension over surprise attack with weapons of mass destruction. To reduce mutual suspicion and to get a measure of protection against surprise attack, the U.S. in 1955 offered its 'open skies' proposal—a proposal which was rejected out of hand by the Soviet Union. It is in relation to the danger of surprise attack that planes of the type of the unarmed civilian U-2 aircraft have made flights along the frontiers of the free world for the past four years."

Cleared Air. If the U.S. felt embarrassed, perhaps rocket-rattling Nikita ("We will bury you") Khrushchev must have found it embarrassing, too, to have the world learn that unarmed, big-target U.S. planes had been flying missions over Soviet territory for four years before his armed forces finally managed to bring one down.

For reasons of his own, Nikita Khrushchev chose to make a spectacular out of the U-2 incident (see FOREIGN NEWS). In Washington, there were some calls for a congressional investigation, and in both the U.S. and Britain some fears were expressed that the U.S., by risking the U-2 flight "at this time," had risked prospects for "agreements" at the summit. But if the shooting down of the U-2 dimmed summit prospects, they could not have been very bright beforehand.

Perhaps they were never very bright.

President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Herter and Under Secretary of State Dillon have all made it clear in recent weeks that the U.S. will go to the summit determined to hold fast to its rights in Berlin, and Nikita Khrushchev has shown in tough-toned speeches that the U.S. firmness has undercut his hopes of making any headway at the summit.

The talk of endangered agreements at the summit showed a short memory of what the cold war was all about and how it got that way. Under standard Communist terms no agreements of any substance or durability were likely to be possible at the summit, before or after the U-2 incident, unless the U.S. and its allies would accede to Russian demands. By candidly admitting that the U.S. is flying intelligence missions over Russia, by vividly reminding the world that a cold war is going on, and by demonstrating that it reserves the right to defend itself in every way it can, the U.S. might have cleared the summit air for some hard talk on hard issues that could be a lot more worthwhile than vague, generalized agreements.

DEFENSE

Flight to Sverdlovsk

(See Cover)

The low black plane with the high tail looked out of place among the shiny military jets crowding the U.S. Air Force base at Incirlik, near Adana, Turkey. Its wide wings drooped with delicate languor—like a squatting seagull, too spent to fly. Its pilot seemed equally odd: a dark, aloof young man who wore a regulation flying suit and helmet but no markings, and had a revolver on his hip. Pilot Francis Gary

Associated Press

More annoying than the one he caught were those that flew unscathed.

Steadily the plane climbed—beyond the ceiling of transports, beyond the ceiling of bombers and interceptors, up through 60,000 ft., beyond the reach of any other operational craft and, as far as the pilot knew, of anti-aircraft fire as well. Back at Incirlik, an operations officer tersely logged the take-off of the high-altitude U-2 weather research flight. If all went well, that was all the official records would ever have to say. Meanwhile, Pilot Powers banked to a course that took him north and east—arcing toward the border of Soviet Russia.

As the world found out last week, Francis Powers, onetime U.S. Air Force first lieutenant, was off on an intrepid flight that would ultimately carry him up the spine of the Soviet Union. From south to north, his high-flying instruments would record the effectiveness of Russian radar, sample the air for radioactive evidence of illicit nuclear tests. The U-2's sensitive infra-red cameras could sweep vast arcs of landscape, spot tall, thin smokestacks or rocket blasts—if there were any—on pads far below.

Francis Powers was on an intelligence mission, like many unsung pilots before him. As such, he was as much a part of the long thin line of U.S. defense as G.I.s on duty in Berlin, technicians manning missile-tracking stations behind him in Turkey, shivering weather watchers drifting through a winter on ice islands in the Arctic. As such, he, and they, were engaged in giving the free world the warning it must have if it is to protect itself from Russian attack, and the shield of intelligence it must have if it is to seek peace.

without the danger of being lured into a fatal trap.


Cloak & Dagger. But Pilot Powers had bad luck: he got caught, and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev says that he talked. Thus Khrushchev had the chance to tell the world about the U-2's mission last week—with all the embellishment and distortion that best suited his case.

After taking off from his base in Turkey on April 27, said Khrushchev, Powers flew across the southern boundary of the U.S.S.R. to Peshawar in Pakistan. From there, on May 1, he took off on a reconnaissance flight that was supposed to take him up the Ural Mountains to Murmansk.

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 on the Kola Peninsula to a landing in Norway (*see map*). Soviet radar tracked him all the way, and over Sverdlovsk, on Khrushchev's personal order, he was shot down at 65,000 ft. by a Soviet ground-to-air rocket. Pilot Powers, said Khrushchev, declined to fire his ejection seat because that would have blown up his plane, its instrumentation and possibly Powers himself. Instead, he climbed out of his cockpit, parachuted to earth and was captured, while his plane crashed near by.

Khrushchev spared no cloak-and-dagger touches. He brandished what he called a poisoned suicide needle that Powers was supposed to use to kill himself to avoid capture. Said Khrushchev: Powers refused to use it—"Everything alive wants to live." Khrushchev displayed high-altitude, infra-red pictures of Soviet targets, which he said had been reclaimed from the U-2's cameras ("The pictures are quite clear. But I must say ours are better"). No one explained how so much could be salvaged from a plane purportedly destroyed by a rocket. Khrushchev waxed in sarcasm as he reported that Powers had carried a conglomeration of French francs, Italian lire and Russian rubles, plus two gold watches and seven gold rings. "What was he going to do?" asked Khrushchev scornfully. "Fly to Mars and seduce Martian women?"

"For the time being," said Khrushchev after threatening a trial for Powers and a press conference at which the remains of the U-2 would be put on public display, "we qualify this aggressive act by an American aircraft . . . as one aimed at nerve-racking, rekindling the cold war and reviving the dead rat while it is not yet prepared for war. Imagine what would happen if a Soviet plane appeared over New York or Chicago," he went on. "U.S. official spokesmen have repeatedly de-



clared that they have. Approved For Release 2004/06/15 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100010005-8
 ers which, on the approach of a foreign plane, can take to the air and head for assigned targets . . . We do not have duty bombers, but we do have duty rockets, which accurately and inevitably will arrive at their appointed targets and do their job more surely and efficiently."

Intelligence Gap. As Khrushchev's scathing statement hit Washington, officials broke their Saturday calm for a day-long series of huddles and telephone calls to the President at his Gettysburg farm. In the end, a week of confusion was washed out with one eminently sensible decision: to tell the truth. With the President's approval, Kapless Lincoln White, the same State Department spokesman who had the day before denied any U.S. overflights of Russia, dictated the statement that a U.S. jet had indeed been snooping for Soviet secrets—as U.S. planes have been doing for the past four years. "The necessity for such activities as measures for legitimate national defense," said White, "is enhanced by the excessive secrecy practiced by the Soviet Union in contrast to the free world."

Such cold-war candor gave the U.S. a chance to discuss with equal candor the massive problem of getting adequate intelligence about the vast Communist nations. The Soviet dictatorship keeps its secrets—even from its own citizens—by the classic techniques of a police state. Travel is restricted, and foreigners off the beaten path are spied on. No news of even an air crash ever appears in the Soviet press unless the Kremlin wants it there; no stories of new weapons or defense plants are ever told by Moscow's radio commentators unless there is a propaganda motive. Secrecy not only enables Khrushchev & Co. to hide what they have but to hide what they don't have as well.

Early in the high-stakes cold-war game, the U.S. knew that it was appallingly weak on its intelligence of the U.S.S.R. This meant that the U.S. had no real basis for shaping its own deterrent force. The U.S. Air Force thought for years that it had to defend itself against a big Russian bomber force when the Soviets actually had switched to missiles. In the dawning age of ICBMs, the U.S. itself became a certain target with all major defense installations well known; yet U.S. forces did not know of any military targets except major Soviet cities, and precious little about the new ones that were behind the Urals. No gap in weapons was ever so serious to U.S. security as the intelligence gap.

Fringe of Space. Soon after the cold war began, heavily loaded U.S. patrol bombers began lugging cameras and electronic gear around the rim of Russia to scout out Soviet radar defenses. As they fought their ill-equipped, cold-war intelligence battles, they counted their casualties from Siberia to Armenia. Some five years ago the Central Intelligence Agency asked California's Lockheed Aircraft Corp. to design an almost incredible plane. It must be capable of deep penetration of



MOSCOW PHOTO OF PURPORTED WRECKAGE OF THE U-2
 Right down on the landscape.

UPI

the Soviet land mass; it must be able to fly far above the possibility of interception—out on the fringes of space. And it must manage its lofty missions while burdened with a maximum of intricate electronic and camera gear. In an astonishing one year later, Lockheed's most expert design team delivered the U-2.

By 1956 U.S. pilots at far-flung airstrips—England, Japan, Turkey, Alaska—began to see the strange, gliderlike jet come and go on its errands. But details of its mission and its performance were hard to

come by. Whenever a U-2 landed, military police swarmed around it. Its pilots were civilians, and when an airman would nudge up close at the officers' club bar to swap plane lore, the U-2 pilot would smile and move along.

Inevitably, though, there were a few crashes, and, inevitably, word got around. In 1957 the Pentagon officially acknowledged the U-2, described it as a high-altitude, single-engined weather research plane—which it surely is. But the public rarely got a look at it. Then one day last September members of a Japanese glider club were shooting landings at a light-plane strip 40 miles southwest of Tokyo. In midafternoon a black jet, its engine dead, wobbled down on the strip.

Fifteen minutes later a U.S. Navy helicopter arrived, disgorged a squad of Americans in civilian clothes. For the first time the pilot opened his canopy, called, "I'm O.K.," and climbed out. The Japanese noted that he carried a pistol at his waist, that his flight suit bore no markings. Moments later more U.S. civilians arrived, drew pistols and ordered the Japanese away from the plane. But not before Eiichi Sekigawa, editor of Tokyo's *Air Views*, got a meticulous description.

Last Inch. The tapered, square-tipped wings, reaching for 45 ft. to either side of a slim 40-ft. fuselage, gave the U-2 the look of a high-performance sailplane. They suggest a range far beyond that circumscribed by the fuel supply. Editor Sekigawa, a glider pilot himself, speculated that the U-2 was built to climb under its own power, soar with its engine cut, for long, valuable miles in the thin upper atmosphere. Its Pratt & Whitney J57 turbojet engine could kick it along at speeds just under the speed of sound, and its light frame could almost surely be coaxed to altitudes close to 100,000 ft.

Everything about the U-2 seemed tailored to obtain the last inch of range, the



U.S. Air Force

PILOT POWERS
 Right up the spine.

last moment of emergency. The straight wings were a model of aerodynamic cleanliness; the raked, razorlike tail added a minimum of drag. Even the landing gear was pared to the final ounce. Light bicycle-type main wheels were aided by wing-tip wheels that were dropped immediately after take-off. Between gliding and plain powered flight, Sekigawa guessed that the U-2 could stay aloft as long as nine hours on a single trip.

"Undoubtedly the plane's activity is largely weather reconnaissance," wrote Sekigawa. "Still it would be idle to think it is not being used for other reconnaissance while it goes about researching air conditions. Otherwise, why was it necessary to threaten Japanese with guns to get them away from the crippled plane? And why did the plane have no identification marks? Why did the pilot have no identifying marks on his clothes?"

Plane-Happy. Editor Sekigawa guessed more than most brass in Washington. Once the U-2 was test-flown, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) set up a pilot training unit ostensibly under control of Lockheed—but most of Lockheed's top officials made it a point to know very little about it. Everything was turned over to Vice President Clarence L. ("Kelly") Johnson, who is in charge of Advanced Development Projects. The training unit recruited select U.S. pilots, and presumably they were drilled in the same rigorous survival training as Strategic Air Command pilots. Presumably they got long special training in high-altitude work.

In 1956 Lockheed recruited Air Force 1st Lieut. Francis Powers. Powers was a plane-happy youngster born in the Cumberland mountain country in Kentucky, near the Virginia border. His father, Oliver Powers, 55, who owns a shoe-repair shop in Norton, Va., reveled in telling callers last week that Francis got his first plane ride at the age of 14, came back to announce: "I left my heart up there, Pap, and I'm goin' back to git it."

On the way to git it, Francis Powers finished high school in Grundy, Va., got a B.A. at Milligan College in Tennessee, and enlisted in the Air Force. In 1951 he was accepted for aviation cadet training, got his wings a year later. But even during the Korean war, when he was a full-fledged jet fighter pilot, Powers never saw service overseas. The Air Force did not seem to hold enough excitement for him, and in 1956 he resigned "to seek employment with civilian industry."

That employment meant the U-2 program at Lockheed. It meant the rigorous training of a modern-day espionage intelligence agent who had first of all to be a fine pilot, whose intricate instruments would do the actual work for him. Powers learned the tight-lipped, laconic line of the secret agent. After he and his wife moved to Turkey, he convinced his parents that he was doing only weather work, that he never flew closer than 100 miles to the borders of Russia, that life in Adana was long repetitious periods of boredom between infrequent flights.

officers believe that the Russians have long known of U-2 surveillance flights. But the U-2, flying at least as high as 80,000 ft., was beyond the reach of their anti-aircraft weapons. To have accused the U.S. of overflights would have been to admit an inability to defend the country against U.S. planes. Whether Khrushchev indeed got himself an accurate new anti-aircraft rocket, or whether—as first U.S. stories had it—Pilot Powers came dangerously low with trouble in his oxygen system, the U.S., at week's end, did not know. In any event the bagging of a U-2 was a moment that Russia's bosses had long looked forward to, and Khrushchev understandably made the most of it.



LOCKHEED'S KELLY JOHNSON
Part of the line of defense.

In the grim gamesmanship of the cold war, Khrushchev scored the U-2 missions as omens of aggression. But as long as U.S. forces need to seek out the sources of possible attack, such flights will continue. Until improved reconnaissance satellites swing into orbit, bold pilots will continue their crossing of a hostile continent. The oxygen mask will continue to put a new face on the secret agent of tradition, marking his release from the hole-and-corner, back-alley deals of history.

The State Department's blunt admission that it was engaged in aerial intelligence may have surprised sophisticates who felt the U.S. would never admit such activity. It may have shocked the innocent who were sure the U.S. would never indulge. But at this late hour of the nuclear age, it is inconceivable that any reasonable government would not accept all risks in the race for such military intelligence. The chance of exposure may be great, but the risk involved in not trying is far greater: the probable penalty would be more than mere embarrassment.

Peaceable Explosions

Amid the excitement about the U-2, Presidential Press Secretary James Hagerty read to newsmen an announcement that, against the background of rumblings in Moscow, sounded deliberately provocative. President Eisenhower, said, the announcement, had approved a massive boost, from \$10 million to \$66 million, in funds for Project Vela, a program of research on detection of underground nuclear tests—and Vela would include, "where necessary, nuclear explosions." Largely because of the awkward timing, the word buzzed far and wide that the President, in reaction to the shooting down of the U-2 and Nikita Khrushchev's tough talk, had decided to resume nuclear tests—suspended in October 1958—as a measure of national preparedness.

But Ike's decision was a logical outgrowth of the East-West negotiations on banning nuclear tests. With U.S. experts disagreeing among themselves about detection of underground nuclear tests, the U.S. had repeatedly made clear that 1) it could not enter into an agreement to ban underground tests without further research on methods of detection, and 2) this research, to be reliable, would have to include actual nuclear explosions, not just conventional explosions.

At the U.S.-British-Russian test-ban conference in Geneva early last week, Soviet Delegate Semyon K. Tsarapkin, on instructions from Moscow, unexpectedly dropped his longtime insistence that any East-West program of research on underground test detection would have to be carried out solely with conventional explosives, agreed to include a "strictly limited number" of nuclear explosions. Viewed in the light of Tsarapkin's concession and the previous history of the test-ban negotiations, Project Vela seemed entirely peaceable.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Cleopatra's Needle

In its patient diplomatic efforts to keep lids on a dozen potential volcanoes in the Arab world, the U.S. has to walk with care along the mountainous hatreds between the Arab nations and Israel. If U.S. diplomacy is offended in principle by the fact that Egypt's Dictator Gamal Abdel Nasser bars the Suez Canal to all Israeli shipping and blacklists all ships that traffic in Israeli ports, in private it thinks first about all those Arab volcanoes spouting at the same time. Last week the State Department found the whole delicately balanced U.S. position in the Middle East jeopardized by two self-appointed groups of mountain movers:

¶ For 24 days the Egyptian passenger-freighter *Cleopatra* has been dockbound in Manhattan, immobilized and unloaded because of a picket line thrown up by the Seafarers International Union (TIME, May 9). The union complained that Nasser's discrimination against ships touching at Israeli ports was, in effect, unfair to U.S.

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

THE NATION

Eruption at the Summit

The high-powered international diplomatic pressure generated by the May Day U-2 intelligence flight over Russia by U.S. Pilot Francis Gary Powers erupted spectacularly this week at the Big Four Summit conference in Paris.

Sitting across the table from the President of the U.S., Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev vented a bitter attack on the U.S. and on Dwight Eisenhower. He withdrew his invitation to the President to visit Russia next month. He demanded an apology for the U-2 flight, threatened



Jim Mohan
SENATOR JOHNSON

to break up the summit conference unless the U.S. would promise to punish all responsible for the flight and promise that all such overflights cease. He suggested, in the kind of face to face insult that strained even cold war diplomacy, that the summit should be adjourned until the U.S. could elect a new president.

The President accused Khrushchev of coming all the way from Moscow to Paris to deliver an "ultimatum" and to "sabotage" the summit meeting, yet offered to meet with him in a private two-way conversation to try to save the summit. But Eisenhower assured Khrushchev that U.S. intelligence overflights had been suspended "and are not to be resumed." Then the President disclosed that he intends to go to the United Nations with a new plan for aerial inspection of all countries to guard against surprise attack—a plan similar to his "open-skies" proposal made to the 1955 summit conference at Geneva, which Russia has repeatedly and emphatically turned down.

Right to Look. The summit eruption was brought on not only by the U-2 flight itself (see following story), but by the

fact that all last week the U.S. took the firm position that, in the circumstances of the cold war, it had a right to defend itself against surprise attack by intelligence activities. This policy was laid down first by Secretary of State Christian Herter in a formal statement. "The Government of the United States," said he, as he prepared to go to the summit, "would be derelict to its responsibility not only to the American people but to free peoples



Paul Schutzer—Life
SECRETARY HERTER
Risk and responsibility accepted.


everywhere if it did not, in the absence of Soviet cooperation, take such measures as are possible unilaterally to lessen and to overcome this danger of surprise attack. In fact, the U.S. has not and does not shirk this responsibility."

When Khrushchev responded with a threat to "strike" and "hit" at any nation that provided an airbase for such U.S. intelligence flights, the State Department replied that the U.S. would defend any foreign nation whose bases were so attacked.

"Utmost Confidence." Herter's proposition was recognized from the beginning as straining the bounds of international law (see box, next page), and promised a briefcase full of problems. But both par-

ties in Congress closed ranks behind it. In the Senate, Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson said: "Espionage and intelligence gathering are not something that cause the cold war. Nikita Khrushchev cannot use this incident in such a way as to divide the American people and to weaken our national strength. The American people are united in a determination to preserve our freedoms, and we are not going to be shaken from that course."

In the House, Missouri Democrat Clarence Cannon, a trained lawyer, brought his colleagues to a standing ovation by revealing that his special subcommittee on appropriations had secretly approved



Walter Bennett
CONGRESSMAN CANNON

the U.S. overflights of the U.S.S.R. from the very beginning, and by praising President Eisenhower, "in whose military capacity (we) have the utmost confidence."

The President told his press conference that the real cause of world tension is not the U.S. policy of high flights but the Soviet "fetish of secrecy and concealment" behind which the U.S.S.R. could prepare a large-scale attack without detection. "No one wants another Pearl Harbor. This means that we must have knowledge of military forces and preparations around the world, especially those capable of massive surprise attacks. Secrecy in the Soviet Union makes this essential . . . Ever since the beginning of my Administration, I have issued directives to gather in every feasible way the information required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for defense."

The secret operations are "supervised by responsible officials," he went on. "We do not use our Army, Navy or Air Force for this purpose, first to avoid any possibility of the use of force in connection

with these activities, and second, because our military forces cannot be given latitude under broad directives but must be kept under strict control."

Common Cause. The right-to-spy proposition had its domestic critics from the beginning. Adlai Stevenson recognized the need for intelligence but asked: "Is it possible that we, the United States . . . could do the very thing we dread: carelessly, accidentally trigger the holocaust?" Columnist Walter Lippmann kept up a running battle from the legal flank: "To avow that we intend to violate Soviet

sovereignty is to put everybody on the spot. The answer is a simple one: to the Soviet government to take the case to the United Nations, where our best friends will be grievously embarrassed."

Nikita Khrushchev did threaten last week to take the issue to the U.N. but the first hours of the summit conference this week proved that his goal was not so much discussion of issues as massive propaganda. And if he wrecked the prospects of meaningful high-level international negotiation in the process, he did not much seem to care.

DEFENSE

Tracked Toward Trouble

For a man whose profession was synonymous with secrecy, Pilot Francis Gary Powers continued to be the most-talked-about man of the week—in the U.S., in allied countries and in Russia, where his pictures were plastered on exhibition walls and where he would soon oust both Dwight Eisenhower and Mark Twain as the best-known American. Bit by bit, a more complete story of his ill-fated U-2 jet flight to Sverdlovsk emerged from

LAW IN THE SKY

What Are the Rights of High Flight?

WHEN the U.S. proclaimed that it has a defensive right to fly high in the sky above Communist territory, it entered into an area of international law as unexplored and uncertain as outer space itself. Says International Lawyer and Political Scientist Hans Morgenthau of the University of Chicago: "There are no legal precedents for such flights."

The U.S. now finds itself in a grey area between war and peace, in a time when old codes are frequently stretched or violated. In the past cold-war decade, Soviet or Red Chinese combat planes have attacked and gunned down half a dozen U.S. patrol planes, several of them well outside Communist borders. The cost: at least 28 U.S. lives. The penalty paid by the Soviets, despite U.S. protests to the World Court: none. In West Berlin, refugees are kidnaped by Communist agents and smuggled behind the Iron Curtain—beyond the reach of Western law. Considering these cold-war realities, does the U.S. have a legal or moral right to bend or break the generally accepted rules covering sovereignty and flights over national borders? The nation's ultimate position hinges on the answers to other questions:

Is espionage legal?

All countries have spies. International law holds spying legal and moral. But no international law protects a captured spy. He has no rights. Usual penalty for wartime spying: death.

Are frontiers held inviolable?

Invasion of another state's frontier is a well-established, old-fashioned breach of international law.

Do frontiers extend into the sky?

All nations agree that a country's territorial rights extend above its land. But that agreement is fairly new—dating from World War I, when man began to appreciate the potential of the airplane as a weapon of combat and reconnaissance.

How high does sovereignty go?

Some legal experts contend that sovereignty ends with the last trace of oxygen—more than 600 miles up. Others note that the three-mile limit at sea was fixed by the range of oldtime land-based guns, figure that the same measure of "effective control" can be applied to the air. By that gauge, a surveillance plane flying at 80,000 ft. could penetrate the U.S.S.R. without violating sovereignty, because so far as is known, no Soviet land-based rocket, missile or plane could touch it.

If the U.S. claims the right to fly over the U.S.S.R., would it have to allow Soviet spy planes to fly over the U.S.?

The Russians would have a strong case. The State Department seeks to deflect it by reminders that President Eisenhower has been working toward an internationally recognized right of overflight in his "Open Skies" plan offered at the 1955 summit conference in Geneva.

Would U.S. defenders now fire upon any Soviet recon-

naissance planes if they were caught over U.S. territory?

Yes, unless the pilot agreed to land and surrender himself and his craft.

Is there a legal difference between an unarmed reconnaissance plane and an unarmed reconnaissance satellite, such as the U.S.'s Tiros?

Plenty. No nation has claimed sovereignty over outer space, where satellites spin. The Soviets have not complained about the well-publicized fact that Tiros takes pictures of Soviet territory. One reason is that Soviet satellites have certainly passed over U.S. territory (though the U.S.S.R. has no picture-taking Tiros types in orbit). Thus the U.S. can make a legal argument that the U.S.S.R. has accepted satellite orbitings by "custom."

Is there a recognized law of self-defense?

International law recognizes self-preservation as a fundamental right. For centuries the self-defense argument has often been used—and sometimes abused—to justify actions of one nation against another.

Can the U.S. legally spy in the sky for self-defense?

Lawyers disagree—sharply. Says Milton Katz, director of international legal studies at Harvard: "The argument of self-defense is difficult to maintain if we're not at war." But other students of international law hold that in the age of hydrogen weapons, when nations can be devastated in a single strike, there is indisputable equity in the position taken by the U.S. Government; yet the Soviets could also claim the equal self-defensive right to shoot down any foreign-spy planes, since radarmen on the ground cannot distinguish an unarmed surveillance plane from a plane carrying a hydrogen bomb.

Does Soviet Russia recognize international law?

Rarely. It has never accepted the jurisdiction of the World Court. It was one of the few major nations that declined to sign the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, which says "every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory." It has questioned whether any treaty with a capitalist nation is binding on a Communist country.

At its best, the body of international law is incomplete, inconsistent—and sometimes incomprehensible. But the U.S. has pledged to support and contribute to a world rule of law. The challenge facing the U.S. is to clarify existing law and to lead the way in expanding the law to cover new situations. In laying down his argument for the U.S. right to defend itself from surprise attack by intelligence activities, Secretary Herter may have contributed to that expansion. Columbia University's Professor Philip Jessup believes that the only practical solution is for the U.S. and its allies to declare "a state of intermediacy"—something between war and peace—and lay down laws to regulate it, just as there are separate laws for war and peace.

the grim, grey silence of international espionage.

Weather Watch. Powers took off from the U.S. Air Force base at Incirlik, near Adana, Turkey, April 27, flew to Peshawar, Pakistan. There he fidgeted nervously, waiting to leave on his biggest mission ever. The demands of diplomacy scarcely figured in the delay; he was looking for perfect weather. He was watching for that rare day when everything would be ideal, when winds aloft promised the necessary boost along the 3,500-mile flight across the Soviet Union toward Norway, when cloud cover would be at a minimum and there would be so little moisture in the upper air that his plane would not form giveaway contrails.

Just five days after he landed at Peshawar, Powers got the go-ahead and took off. Friendly radars tracked him as far as they could across the Soviet frontier; then a U.S. radio watch tuned in on Soviet defense frequencies. The chatter of frustrated Russians was familiar and reassuring to the U.S. monitors as the intruder was passed from one Russian military zone to another. U-2 penetrations were no secret to the Soviets; Powers and other pilots had made them often during the past four years. The Russians had fired rockets, but the rockets had fallen short at some 60,000 ft.; MIG fighter planes had flashed after them and had mushed helplessly at the same altitude, well below the U-2's lofty sanctuary of 80,000-100,000 ft.

Direct Hit? This time the pattern changed. Over Sverdlovsk in the Soviet Urals, where his flight plan called for a half-left turn to take him northwestward toward Norway, Powers suddenly ran into trouble—probably an engine failure. "He's coming lower," said excited Russian radio-men. Listeners at U.S. outposts hung helplessly on every word while Russian antiaircraft batteries chattered tersely about the enemy plane spiraling downward into range. When the U-2 dropped to 40,000 ft., the Russians stopped talking.

Proudly, the Russian press later reported how a "rocket rushed into the stratosphere with a powerful roar," how "fragments of the foreign-spy aircraft fell through the rays of the May sun." In an effort to prove that a Soviet rocket had scored a direct hit, Khrushchev himself displayed the picture of a thoroughly wrecked plane, at the same time showed off high-altitude pictures of Soviet installations which he said had been recovered from the U-2's cameras. This raised an obvious question: How had the cameras survived such a splintering crash?

The Soviet press had no more trouble changing its tune than the U.S. State Department had forgetting its original "weather-flight" fantasy. The rocket, said a Moscow dispatch, had exploded under the U-2's tail, damaging the ejection seat. Pilot Powers had ridden his crippled ship down to 40,000 ft. before bailing out. Presumably, the Russians were claiming that the ship then fluttered in for a not-too-damaging crash landing on its own. Whether it did, or whether Powers flew his



PHOTOS OF U.S. PILOT POWERS IN MOSCOW DISPLAY
Out of the plain necessity of espionage.

Edmund Stevens

plane all the way down, this version neatly demolished Khrushchev's story that Powers had been afraid to pull the pin on his ejection seat for fear that it had been rigged to kill him.


Told to Talk. Despite such discrepancies, there was no doubt that the Russians had bagged the U-2. They had Powers, and they displayed some convincing wreckage. The long, gliderlike wings were remarkably intact. The Pratt & Whitney J57 jet engine was easily identifiable, as were the U.S. manufacturers' labels on cameras and electronic gear. Along with the varied supply of foreign money that Khrushchev had reported in the captured pilot's possession, the Soviets also laid out a pistol, a tube of morphine, a flashlight, a half-pack of Kent cigarettes, a Social Security card (No. 230-30-0321), a couple of pocketknives. Powers' suicide needle, they said, had been tested on a dog,

and the animal had died in 30 seconds.

They had Powers' "confession," too ("I plead guilty to the fact that I have flown over Soviet territory"), but any suggestion that his prompt admission marked him as a defector was quickly denied in Washington. In an age of such sophisticated third-degree methods as "truth serums," agents are taught to recognize the inevitable—and talk. Powers, for one, had little to tell beyond his own personal history. He had been trained as a pilot, not a spy. His instruments did his snooping for him.

Cover Story. Neutral intelligence experts, while admiring the daring of Powers' mission, cocked an eyebrow at what they considered poor U.S. intelligence planning. Obviously, the U.S. was using as a "cover" the story that the U-2 was engaged in weather-reconnaissance work. This story may have placated allies in case of U-2 trouble, but it was bound to fall apart if both plane and pilot were captured. Conventional cloak-and-dagger types argued that the U.S. should have kept a discreet silence in the face of all talk about the U-2. They wondered, too, why the U.S., if it really wanted to ensure against detection, could not have subcontracted the job to a foreign pilot without a country, perhaps a refugee from a Communist satellite.

But such subterfuges would probably not have satisfied critics or kept Khrushchev from making whatever use he wanted of the incident. And for all Khrushchev's claims, the U.S. was convinced that an oxygen-system failure or an engine "flame-out" had forced Pilot Powers down within rocket range, and, most importantly, that the Soviets still do not have an antiaircraft rocket capable of reaching the U-2's operating altitude. How the CIA will make use of this information, now that the U-2 program has been compromised, is still the CIA's secret.



John Bryson

U.S.'s U-2
Into an unplanned turn to Moscow.

THE PRESIDENCY

"Even More Objectionable"

As planned by the Democrats who pushed it through Congress, the \$251 million aid-to-depressed-areas bill was vetoed by the President last week and fell into place as a plank in the 1960 Democratic campaign platform.

Ike, in sending the bill back to Congress, recalled his veto of a bloated \$389.5 million depressed-areas bill in 1958, saw "in 1960, another election year," an "even more objectionable" approach to a long-neglected problem. His chief objection to the openhanded, broadly defined Democratic bill: "It would make eligible for federal assistance areas that don't need it."

In contrast to the Administration's \$53 million relief measure, said the President, the Democrats' bill "would squander the federal taxpayers' money where there is only temporary economic difficulty," would downgrade local self-help efforts by massive federal subsidy, might involve the Government in industry-financing in 600 eligible rural counties, and would largely overlap existing federal programs.

Chances of overriding the veto: nil. Chances of passing the Administration's alternative bill: dim.

REPUBLICANS

Back in the Race

New York's Governor Nelson Rockefeller got back in the Republican presidential race this week.

Faced with Vice President Nixon's overwhelming claim on the nomination, Rocky had withdrawn last December as an active challenger. Republicans of every hue, including Dick Nixon, immediately and persistently began to woo him as the most promising vice-presidential candidate around, but Rocky straight-armed every proposal. Last week Rockefeller announced that, to avoid any possible vice-presidential stampede, he would stay away from the Republican convention in Chicago.

This was the signal for New York's Republican state chairman, L. Judson Morhouse, to issue what amounted to a stinging challenge to Nixon, urging the 96-vote New York delegation to go to Chicago uncommitted, Morhouse said: "We must recognize that the place for Rockefeller's broad appeal, reaching beyond party lines, is at the head of the ticket. Unless our national ticket this fall is headed by a candidate capable of the appeal that thrusts across and beyond Republican Party lines, we stand in serious danger of losing not only the presidency, but also the state legislature and many of our local offices."

"I believe that Governor Rockefeller should not be ruled out of consideration for the presidency—and that he should not rule himself out. He is not an active candidate and he will not seek the nomination: he has made this plain. The fact remains that he—alone with the Vice President—is one of the truly forceful



ROCKEFELLER & MORHOUSE

He won't play—unless he's pitching.

and distinguished leaders on the national scene. The Republican Party as a whole therefore must look to one or the other of these men as its best hope in 1960, and it must designate the wisest choice in the July convention."

DEMOCRATS

Forward Look

The first salmon streaks of dawn were coming up over Washington's National Airport when the darkened Convair winged in from West Virginia. Jackie Kennedy lay curled in sleep on a back seat, but her husband, the hero of the night before, was wide awake. As soon as the plane door opened, he hurried over to a vending machine, plunked in a dime and plucked out an early edition of the *Washington Post*. KENNEDY SWEEPS WEST VA. VOTE, proclaimed the headline. Chuckled Jack Kennedy: "I wouldn't be surprised if Lyndon and Stu might be having a conference today."

It was a logical guess. Kennedy's big victory had produced a sinking feeling in the camps of his rivals for the Democratic presidential nomination. Minnesota's Hubert Humphrey withdrew from the race and hurried home to campaign for the Senate. Texas' Lyndon Johnson and Missouri's Stuart Symington, the candidates who had sidestepped the primaries, now had every reason to form a grand alliance. Each made the usual brave comments. Said Symington: "The primary will not be any more decisive than Wisconsin." Said Johnson: "The nation can start judging on the basis of merit." But nobody was fooled; the political hour was growing late for Johnson and Symington—and later still for Adlai Stevenson, whose friends indicated that if someone would just promise to make him Secretary of State, he'd be happy.

Liberal List. Washington waited in vain for the stop-Kennedy summit meeting. It never came. Neither Symington nor Johnson was willing at this time to bow

out in favor of the other; Stevenson was out in favor of Kennedy, but decided to wait out the results of this week's Oregon primary, where all hopefuls—including Oregon's own Wayne Morse—were entered. In the lull, United Auto Workers' Walter Reuther, political shop steward of Michigan's Governor G. Mennen Williams, came out for Kennedy. So did Humphreyman Joseph Rauh, vice chairman of Americans for Democratic Action.* And even Eleanor Roosevelt, who has had her reservations about Jack Kennedy's Catholicism, issued the matriarchal opinion that he, more than either Symington or Johnson, "will be considered the candidate of the liberals."

The Ichabod specter of Estes Kefauver clomped through the stop-Kennedy speculation and talk. In 1952, with a successful string of 13 primaries behind him, the Keef was stopped cold in mid-convention by President Harry Truman and the Democratic bosses simply because he did not fit their image of a nominee. No such feelings exist about Kennedy, and his one big bugaboo—his Catholic religion—was gone with West Virginia.

Southern Secession. With nobody willing to step aside and nobody really determined to stop Kennedy, the situation of the rivals began to disintegrate. Truman endorsed Symington, as everyone expected him to, but even that had a slight boomerang quality about it. Questioned in Chicago by reporters, Truman said limply that the only thing he had against Kennedy was the fact that "he lives in Massachusetts." Campaigning in Maryland, Jack cracked back: "I have news for Mr. Truman. Mr. Symington was born in Massachusetts." In the South there were signs of an incipient secession from Lyndon Johnson. A wobbly move to nominate Herman Talmadge as a strategic favorite son began in Georgia. Commented the *Atlanta Constitution*: "This will further increase the probability that Senator Kennedy will be nominated on the first ballot." In Arkansas, Governor Orval Faubus noted that Kennedy seems to have "started a trend."

A grim group of Washington strategists tossed out the possibility that a crisis growing out of the Paris summit conference might change the whole picture. Such a time of national peril, they suggested, could make the Democratic Convention reject Kennedy as too young and too inexperienced to cope with Nikita Khrushchev. A better crisis candidate, the whisper went, might be Johnson, the cool, bipartisan helmsman, or Symington, the military expert, or Stevenson, the internationalist. It all had the sound, though, of whistling in the growing dark.

* But not all liberals share the enthusiasm for Kennedy. Said the liberal *Nation* last week: "The Republican passion for Senator Kennedy is obviously based on the theory that however formidable he may be as a pre-convention candidate, he would be a weak nominee for the Democrats." In somewhat the same vein, Republicans have grinned over the fact that Kennedy has nominated New York's Nelson Rockefeller as his "strongest" possible opponent.

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May 30, 1960


NATIONAL AFFAIRS

FOREIGN RELATIONS

High Cards

In the tons of coverage and commentary out of Paris last week, the most over-worked cliché was: "Khrushchev overplayed his hand." This implied a general agreement that the U.S. had dealt him a strong hand to play—at least for propaganda's sake. Some of the U.S.-dealt high cards:

The Question of Timing. The value of U-2 surveillance over Russia had been established by results (*see* Defense), but the question of whether to overfly Soviet



A.D.P.

HAGERTY IN PARIS
Too late for open skies.

U.S. AIR FORCE MAY 30, 1960

territory just before the summit. The purpose of all such subterfuge was to give Ike a bargaining point at the conference table. He planned to offer the U-2 and its equipment to the U.N. for international "open skies" inspection, and in the same package to abandon overflights of Russia. But he waited too long. Khrushchev boldly played his propaganda high card, one that could easily have been finessed by a pre-Paris announcement that the flights had been discontinued. Finally, under Khrushchev's intense pressure, Hagerty announced that Ike had actually ordered the U-2 flights canceled just before leaving for Paris. The order had gone, said Hagerty, to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Nathan Twining, and to Defense Secretary Gates (thus casually demolishing the President's earlier statements that the military had no part in the U-2 program). Actually, the U-2 program died the very day Pilot Powers was shot down. As an intelligence-gathering instrument, the flights had been compromised by discovery, and CIA Director Allen Dulles, the man in charge, had canceled the program without a moment's hesitation.

The Decision to Lie. The standard spy "cover story"—of a weather flight that developed oxygen failure—was put forth in haste when Khrushchev first announced that a U-2 had been shot down, and was poorly planned. Its creators had clearly never considered the very real possibility of a U-2 or its pilot being captured, and were trapped in a lie when Khrushchev had the goods. Yet such are the unchanging habits of bureaucracy that U.S. cloak-and-dagger types, only 48 hours before the scheduled start of the summit, actually prepared an announcement that U-2 oxygen gear had passed re-examination and flights would continue. Happily, this announcement was killed.

Telling the Truth. Once its cover story was exposed, the U.S. fumbled. All day, after Khrushchev announced that Pilot Powers was in custody, "alive and kicking," Secretary of State Herter conferred on the situation, finally called President Eisenhower at Gettysburg, and got his approval for a State Department statement. Eisenhower and Herter announced that the surveillance flight had taken place (and thus admitted the first U.S. lie), and justified the U-2 program on the basis of the fear of surprise attack. Then, because Khrushchev himself had publicly seemed to exonerate President Eisenhower of blame, they went along with the diplomatic game by stating that the flight had been made without the knowledge of authorities in Washington.

Taking Responsibility. It took just one day for Ike to realize his mistake. An editorial flap blew up because the President had apparently been unaware of one of his Administration's most delicate and dangerous activities. Presidential ignorance of a specific plane flight would not have been beyond belief. But no charge by the political opposition piques Press Secretary Jim Hagerty more than the charge that Ike is not on top of his job. Furthermore, Communist propaganda likes to say that Eisenhower is the innocent dupe of Pentagon "war planners." Ike reversed himself, aggressively shouldered all the blame for the U-2 May Day flight. By this time critics were saying that the U.S. should stick to one side or the other, moralists were saying that the U.S. should not lie, and sophisticates in the espionage trade were saying that the U.S. did wrong to tell the truth.

Reversing the Policy. Before he left for Paris, Secretary of State Herter made a statement justifying continued overflights. Reporters were told to draw their own conclusions. Press Secretary Hagerty bluntly denied a New York Times story that U-2 flights had been canceled. Ike,

seemed to echo Herter's position.

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By all the signs, Khrushchev intended to walk out of the game regardless of the play of cards. But his own cover story for his wrecking operation earned more credence than it should have.

POLITICS

The Peace Issue

In rudely announcing that he could not or would not negotiate with the U.S. until a new President is elected, Nikita Khrushchev waded right into U.S. politics. His humiliation of President Eisenhower was something that no American could tolerate, and Washington's first instinctive,



ADLAI STEVENSON
Angry apostle.



Don Uhrbrock

LYNDON JOHNSON
Desperate coxswain.

shocked reaction was to unite behind the President. Like good coxswains, House Speaker Sam Rayburn and Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson did what they could to get the Democrats to pull together with the Administration. Mister Sam clamped an iron rule of silence on one-minute opening speeches, traditional sounding board in the House, and in the Senate Johnson led the rally to Ike.

While there still seemed a prospect of continuing the summit, Adlai Stevenson and Arkansas' Senator J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, joined Johnson and Rayburn in signing a cable to Ike, urging him to "convey to Premier Khrushchev the view of the opposition party in your country that he reconsider his suggestion for a postponement of the summit conference until after the national elections in this country." All this was both good patriotism and good politics. But before the week was out, even before the President returned to Washington (to be greeted by Mister Sam and a phalanx of Democratic loyalists among the 2,000 airport welcomers), politics became its more natural self.

"Confusing Zigzags." Adlai Stevenson started it. In a Washington interview, he angrily blamed the summit crisis on Administration bungling of the U-2 affair. Desperately, Johnson tried to keep the party peace ("This is definitely a time for America to unite"), but a partisan murmur had already begun. Leading the rebel yell was Johnson's own majority whip, Montana's Mike Mansfield, who predicted a congressional investigation. "At the proper time," Mansfield promised, "we shall find out what lies beneath the confusing zigzags of official pronouncements of the past fortnight."

Politicians knew the issue had thorny possibilities, and grasped the nettle gingerly. But the kind of arguments they

would use were already being made by the pundits. In an odd dispatch that almost achieved a "plague on both your houses" equality between Khrushchev's and Eisenhower's performances, the New York Times's Washington Bureau Chief James Reston called the summit "a serious defeat for the President and his whole system of delegating presidential power to subordinates at critical moments in the history of the nation." Added Columnist Walter Lippmann: "The damage to our prestige would be irreparable if we all rallied around the President and pretended to think that there was nothing seriously wrong . . . It is the dissenters and the critics and the opposition who can restore the world's respect for American competence." Then Adlai Stevenson went all out.

Vital Negotiations. "We handed Khrushchev the crowbar and sledge hammer to wreck this meeting," said he, in an angry speech in Chicago. "Without our series of blunders, Mr. Khrushchev would not have the pretext for making his impossible demand and his wild charges." Stevenson suggested that the Democrats could best negotiate with the Russians. "The Administration has acutely embarrassed our allies and endangered our bases," said he. "They have helped make successful negotiations with the Russians—negotiations that are vital to our survival—impossible so long as they are in power. We cannot sweep this whole sorry mess under the rug in the name of national unity."

From Lewiston, Idaho came an answering echo from gallivanting Jack Kennedy, who had not been saying much about foreign affairs lately. "Our leadership appears palsied," he said, "and sympathy, not respect, is the reluctant sentiment we elicit from our allies—sympathy for the President as a man of good will, but dismay at the shocking lack in presidential directive as displayed in the U-2 incident. The maintenance of peace and the security of Berlin should not hang on the constant possibility of engine failure."

These were the first bugle notes of a cacophony that would be heard all summer. Until the summit collapse, the Republicans seemed in good control of the peace and prosperity issues. They may still be when all the dust settles. Where stood the peace issue now? Pondering the situation, G.O.P. National Chairman Thruston Morton could only shake his head: "It hasn't jelled. It hasn't jelled."

Unfavorable Accents. The New York Times's veteran Arthur Krock, admitting that "this is only dope, but American politicians are incurably addicted to its use," passed on this consensus of Washington politicians:

"The new critical aspects of the world situation have raised the Democratic convention stocks of Johnson and Stevenson. They also have given Senator Symington a better opportunity to exploit his pioneer criticisms of the Eisenhower military defense programs. They tend to accent unfavorably Senator Kennedy's youth and administrative inexperience. Nixon will be

hurt only by a significant loss in the defense of Executive handling of the U-2 episode, but Khrushchev's attacks will make his nomination even more certain and help his electoral prospect."

As politicians grappled with the new situation, Richard Nixon was reported by his press secretary to be "greatly shocked" by the Stevenson speech. The Republican National Committee charged that Stevenson had fallen "like a ton of bricks for the Khrushchev line." Franklin Roosevelt's onetime campaign manager, Jim Farley, 71, angrily accused Stevenson of trying "to sledge hammer and crowbar another disastrous nomination for himself as the apostle of appeasement."

Nikita Khrushchev himself had undoubtedly not made his own last contribution to the U.S. campaign, and the warier political experts were not placing any final bets yet.



DEFENSE

Longest Stretch

The big bird screamed upward off its Cape Canaveral launching pad, nosed over toward the southeast, curved down the length of the Atlantic and navigated 9,000 miles before its nose cone splashed hard by its chosen target just south of Madagascar in the Indian Ocean. In exactly 52½ minutes last week, the 130-ton, 75-ft. Atlas rocket set a new U.S. missile record and beat the Russians' best distance mark by more than 1,000 miles.

The long shot needed a nicety of aiming and timing. Soaring 1,000 miles toward outer space at speeds up to 17,000 m.p.h., the instrument-packed Atlas would have arced into orbit if its trajectory had been a shade lower or if its engines had cut out seconds late. But everything clicked precisely. As the earth spun beneath it, the rocket traced a twisting trajectory across the surface of the globe. It shaded the coast of Brazil, looped around the Cape of Good Hope, was heading almost due east when it dumped its payload into the sea. It had flown across one-third of the world without once flying over land.

Originally, like the Russians' dummy in a spaceship, the shot had been scheduled to impress the world on the eve of the summit, but technical failures delayed it.

it made its point: that the Atlas can reach any target in the world from hardened bases in the continental U.S. And it proved that the missile has enough extra boost to indulge in a roundabout, enemy-confusing route.

The U-2's Record

The moment the Lockheed U-2 made a name for itself, it was a goner—grounded by the unforgiving glare of publicity. But in its brief career, while its mission and its methods were still a well-kept secret, the high-soaring U.S. intruder logged one of the most rewarding records in the history of military aviation. Bits and pieces of that record leaked out last week after the U-2 was ordered from the flight line, its clandestine usefulness damaged beyond immediate repair by the bad luck of getting caught.

Over the four years of its unchallenged high flying, the U-2 made contributions to U.S. defense, said one high-ranking Air Force general, that were "simply colossal." Using its infra-red detectors, its radars and its conventional cameras, it mapped hundreds of thousands of square miles of Soviet territory. With its pinpoint pictures it revised the face of Air Force charts. Prior to U-2 flights, the U.S. depended primarily on World War II German aerial photos for target material. Today the folders of SAC bomber crews bulge with accurate pictures of potential enemy targets. Guidance data, which are cranked into the navigation systems of U.S. B-52s and B-47s, come from the long-winged U-2. Thor missiles in England, the new Atlases in the U.S., even the lowly, air-breathing Matadors and Maces facing eastward from Europe have been primed with dope from U-2 missions.

But this is the kind of information that ages overnight. Targets change; new menaces appear. The demand for more and more intelligence is endless. The U-2 had a busy future planned when everything was ruined by Pilot Francis Powers' crash near Sverdlovsk. Powers himself had hoped to photograph the ICBM and satellite launching area in the vast, lonely desert near the Aral Sea. His specific target was a great new rocket at least twice the size of the U.S.'s mighty 107-ft. Atlas Centaur. Earlier, in 1958, the Soviets had set up a giant rocket complex in the same area, and the U-2s had snapped shots of one of the superbirds on its pad. Then the rocket, the pad—everything—disappeared. Only a huge crater and surrounding area of destruction suggested the disaster that had hit the test site.

Much of the U-2 accomplishment is still held secret and much of its career will remain under wraps indefinitely—at least until successful, camera-equipped reconnaissance satellites take its place in global skies. Apart from Francis Powers, even its skilled pilots from CIA's secret 10/10 squadron will have to remain anonymous. "If the full story is ever told," said a high-ranking U.S. intelligence man last week, "there won't be enough medals to pin on pilots."

Hunt Agent Who Sold Powers Out to Reds

By JERRY GREENE

Military Editor of THE NEWS

(© 1960 by News Syndicate Co., Inc.)

Washington, May 12 (NEWS Bureau).—U. S. counterspies have launched a mammoth manhunt in Turkey and other Mideastern countries for the agent who sold out pilot Francis Powers' flight plan for his high altitude reconnaissance mission over Russia, THE NEWS was told tonight.

Officials here disclosed they have firm evidence that Powers was a sitting duck from the moment he left his home air base at Adana in Turkey. He was tracked by Russian radar from the minute he gained his more

than 70,000-foot altitude northwest of Peshawar in Pakistan.

The intelligence reports show that Powers had an engine flame-out above 70,000 feet—one source puts his exact altitude at 90,000 feet—and descended to 37,000

engine.
U. S. officials from the National Aeronautics and Space Agency, his ostensible bosses, to whom he reported his weather observations, were in radio contact with him until he had de-

when he was the engine firing Powers was given direct orders to bail out and blow up the aircraft.

Obviously, an informed source said, these orders either were not received or were disregarded.

The air experts here are convinced that Powers rode the plane down and made a belly landing. They say damage to the

U-2 was not nearly sufficient to have resulted from any sort of free-falling crash.

Obvious Penetration

"Somebody sold him out," a top official here said grimly. "And we want him. Obviously, the Soviet agents have penetrated our operations on the ground."

Powers was on the Peshawar-Norway route, which has been flown so often it is called "milk run" in aviation circles familiar

with the project. The chief target is the comparatively new Russian rocket and missile center at Tyura Tam, due south of Arlsk on the banks of the Syr River, near its junction with the Aral Sea.

The intelligence agencies here had received persistent reports that the Russians were going to attempt a major surprise space shot of some sort in connection either with the summit meeting or the trip of President Eisenhower to Moscow next month.

The flight on which Powers was captured was intended specifically to determine what sort of spectacular the Russians had in mind.

The Russians had set up the Tyura Tam base to get out of range of U. S. radar in eastern Turkey, which had been checking previous Soviet rocket and missile experiments. But because of other radar and the high altitude planes, the move proved futile.

Tracked All the Way

Several of the U-2 flights across Russia have been tracked part of the time by the Red army radar. The U. S. knew this, but the Powers attempt was said to have been the first which was picked up almost from the moment it started. The Russians were with him all the way.

Neither Khrushchev nor his armed forces have either planes or rockets that can destroy aircraft at anything like the 70,000-90,000 feet at which the U-2 was flying, Air Force intelligence sources reported.

This is one reason why the Strategic Air Command has felt certain that its jet bombers could carry out any required mission, even though they do not have quite such altitude capabilities.

Was Souped Up Job

Powers' U-2 was souped up with a new J-75P13 engine which, with 15,000 pounds of thrust, gave it far greater performance than the older models using the J-57 "standard" engine it was said to have previously.

U. S. Technical experts who have examined the wreckage now on display in a Moscow park said the plane was equipped with radio radar ground reconnaissance systems, with dome antennas with design numbers MP 11719 and MP 12570.

Its Photo Equipment

The plane had seven glass ports for cameras and a 9-by-18 inch film size camera designated 73BB. Also there was an astro-tracker for calibrating pictures in flight by reference to the sun.

The air speed indicator of the plane was stuck at 340 knots, but airmen said this could have been bounced around in the belly landing.

They said it would have been possible for the instruments to have survived intact from a free fall or a missile explosion.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, May 12, 1960

DN

U. S. Heard Russians Chasing U-2

While Drew Pearson is en route to the summit conference his associate, Jack Anderson is covering the Washington scene.

By Jack Anderson

The terse radio exchanges between the Russian pilots who shot down an American spy plane over Sverdlovsk 1200 miles inside Russia were picked up by supersensitive listening devices in Turkey, it has now been learned.

The last words that crackled over the radio were one pilot's excited shout: "He's turning left!" Then silence.

Despite the great distance, the Red fliers' conversation was overheard distinctly through monitoring equipment which Uncle Sam uses to keep an ear to the ground along the Soviet border.

From official reports that no longer can be considered secret, this column has pieced together the dramatic story of Francis Powers' fateful flight into Premier Khrushchev's arms.

Powers was on the lookout for a space spectacular which the Russians had hinted they might attempt on May Day. His course took him over the missile center from which they



Anderson

were expected perhaps to launch a man into space. As it turned out, Powers provided the May Day spectacular.

Soviet Trap?

Some officials suspect he was lured into a trap which the Russians had baited with their May Day hints. But although Uncle Sam was curious about what the Russians might be up to, surveillance of the missile center was only a small part of his assignment. He was supposed to complete a photo-reconnaissance mission through the heart of Russia from the Pakistan border to Sverdlovsk, then left over Murmansk to the Norwegian air base at Budo.

The weather determined the course and timing of his mission more than the Soviet's May Day plans. The upper altitude had to be free of moisture, so his high-soaring jet plane wouldn't leave a vapor trail. He also wanted to avoid clouds which might obscure his camera's vision.

Conclusion: It is unlikely the Russians had any advance warning of his coming, though their vigil may have been sharper than usual on May Day.

Powers posed as a civilian pilot flying weather reconnaissance missions for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration out of Adana, Turkey. Not even his wife was permitted to know of his true work.

He took off from Adana, as Khrushchev reported, on April 27. He stayed at Peshawar,

Pakistan, until the weather was right for his daring mission.

Poisoned Needle

He did not call for help to commit suicide in order to avoid capture. In fact, he carried a survival kit which was supposed to help him keep alive in case of mishap. It was true the kit included a poisoned needle, however, which he was expected to conceal and use only to escape torture.

Powers cruised across Russia in the thin, blue-black air above 75,000 feet. As he approached Sverdlovsk our monitors picked up excited Russian commands which indicated he had been detected.

Even as the Soviet interceptors gave chase the American trackers were not unduly alarmed. A U-2 spy plane had been spotted once before over Russia, but on its lofty course it had kept out of Soviet reach and had fled home safely.

The Soviets have planes which can soar far above 75,000 feet, but they can't maneuver at the same level as the light, glider-like U-2.

The Russian shout "He's turning left!" indicated Powers was calmly following his prescribed flight plan which called for a left swing over Sverdlovsk.

What happened thereafter can only be conjectured. Khrushchev's statement suggests a rocket fragment may have crippled Powers' plane. Or the motor may have stalled, forcing him to dive below

40,000 feet to start it again. The first Russian report claimed he was bagged around 30,000 feet.

State's Fabrication

The news that Powers might be down in Russia was flashed immediately to Washington. Only the topmost officials knew what Powers was doing over Russia. They got together last Sunday for a frantic hush-hush conference. The State Department representative wanted to fabricate the story that Powers had reported an oxygen failure on a weather flight over Lake Van, Turkey. The Defense Department argued it was senseless to deny what Khrushchev probably would be able to prove.

The decision was referred to the White House which approved the State Department plan. Whether President Eisenhower was personally consulted isn't known. Certainly he should have been.

In a desperate attempt to make the phony story stick, a report of an oxygen failure over Lake Van was circulated through normal channels, and search planes were sent from Adana to comb the lake area for the missing plane.

Not until Khrushchev revealed Russia had captured Powers complete with his survival kit and espionage equipment did Secretary of State Herter decide it would be better to confess the truth before matters got any worse.

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May 23, 1960

Mr. DIRKSEN. Yes.

Mr. CARROLL. The sledge hammer and the crowbar?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Oh, no. Adlai did that.

Mr. CARROLL. The Senator from Illinois did it by himself?

Mr. DIRKSEN. No; Adlai did that.

Mr. CARROLL. The Senator did not know that others would be here in the Chamber to help attempt to cut down and hamstring one of the great political figures in contemporary American history?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I would not do it for the world. I have too much affection for the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. CARROLL. I am sure of that. We have heard about sledge hammers and crowbars, but who put the monkey wrench in the summit? If the majority leader and minority leader said that we should have an investigation—

Mr. DIRKSEN. I said nothing about an investigation.

Mr. CARROLL. Oh, the Senator does not want an investigation?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I do not care who wants an investigation. I make the decisions for myself. I know what I want to say. I have some notion about what the English language conveys. I did not say anything about investigation. Now that the Senator has brought up the subject of monkey wrenches, I think we had better add that to Adlai Stevenson's instrumentalities, because he will probably need it.

Mr. CARROLL. Let us be careful that those instrumentalities do not combine to produce nuclear fatalities, brought on by those responsible for the blunders.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I have been living in the same State with Adlai for years. I love him. I just disagree with him.

Mr. CARROLL. I may say to the Senator from Illinois I was not talking about him personally, because I recognize the tolerance, the statesmanship, and the political sagacity of the Senator from Illinois. We are talking about a different matter here today.

Will not the Senator from Illinois agree with me, from our years of service in the House, there is nothing about the junior Senator from Massachusetts that shows he is either an appeaser—

Mr. DIRKSEN. I did not say he was an appeaser. I am responsible only for my own words.

Mr. CARROLL. Does the Senator say the Senator from Massachusetts is not an appeaser?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I have never used other than the most polite and courteous language to my distinguished friend from Massachusetts; and if I say anything about him, it will be only to toss him a dainty bouquet. [Laughter.]

Mr. KENNEDY. May I say it comes late, but I am a grateful receiver.

Before I take my seat, I wish to point out that the other day the Republican chairman said that—

Loyal Americans will not take kindly to any politician willing to run down the President for the sake of personal advantage.

The key words in that sentence are "loyal Americans."

Under this formula, approved for Release 2004/06/15 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100010005-8
Lican chairman—today and for the next

few months—any of us who feel obligated to criticize American foreign policy run the risk, of being accused as "disloyal appeasers" and "turnquotes."

But despite that risk the criticism is going to continue. It is our function and responsibility to criticize when there are weaknesses to criticize. And we propose to meet that responsibility. The Democratic Party would be unworthy of its traditions and its responsibility as a party if it did not fulfill the vital function of legitimate criticism, heedless of whether the Governor of New Hampshire may say we are soft on communism or the Senator from Pennsylvania may say it is necessary that I purge myself of the charges of appeasement. These points—these critical issues—will continue to be debated, and I hope much of this debate will be carried on on the floor of the Senate—as well as across the Nation.

Before I sit down, I thank the Senator from Colorado [Mr. CARROLL], the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON], the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], and the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON] for their kind remarks.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. SCOTT. I wish to make a further correction. I again invite the attention of the Senator to the fact that I did not use the phrase that he should purge himself of a suggestion of appeasement. The Senator has my notes before him. The Senator knows that I said—as nearly as I can remember, since the Senator has my notes and is holding on to them—that he should resist the suspicion of appeasement. The Senator has made a very good case in so resisting.

I also add that I mentioned earlier I had made a note—

Mr. KENNEDY. The Senator did not say what he says. He is "turn quoting."

Mr. SCOTT. The Senator has my notes.

Mr. KENNEDY. The Senator is "turn quoting."

Mr. SCOTT. The Senator has my notes.

Mr. KENNEDY. The Senator said:

It is my hope that they will relieve themselves of the curse of suspicion of appeasement.

Mr. SCOTT. The Senator accepts that as what I said?

Mr. KENNEDY. I know the Senator wanted to say what he has said, but he did not say it. He did not say "resist;" he said "relieve."

Mr. SCOTT. "Relieve." I accept what I said. I do not withdraw it. The Senator may recall that I made some reference to the question whether I said "turn quote" in the first instance.

Mr. KENNEDY. The Senator does not withdraw the statement?

Mr. SCOTT. I said that there were notes around on some Senator's desk which showed I had that notation. A page, while the Senator from Massachusetts was talking, has found that I said with the Senator from Massachusetts, among his moments.

The Senator will see that the word written in my notes is "turn quote."

Mr. KENNEDY. Does the Senator withdraw the statement: "It is my hope that they—" which would include me—"will relieve themselves of the curse of suspicion of appeasement"?

Mr. SCOTT. I will say to the Senator, as I said before, I do not feel that the Senator is an appeaser. The Senator, in the statement which he made, claimed that the statements by a newspaperman were taken out of context. If that is correct—and I have no reason to feel that it is not correct—the Senator has, to that degree, removed himself from the application of my remarks with respect to appeasement.

I desire at all times to be fair with the Senator from Massachusetts, but I do not and cannot withdraw from the Record the newspaper report which was put into the Record not by me but by the Senator from Illinois. I hope the Senator from Massachusetts understands that.

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes. I appreciate what the Senator has said, and the remarks of the Senator from Illinois.

The statement of Mr. Shoemaker has been added to by the entire statement. I think that the full statement quite clearly shows what I intended to say—my point of view—which was reported, as I said, that way by the Associated Press. Therefore, I am delighted that the Senator has chosen to withdraw his statement.

Mr. SCOTT. Obviously no one questions the courage, the devotion, or the patriotism of the Senator from Massachusetts. My question was pointed up on the newspaper article. We have discussed it thoroughly. The Senator has offered his explanation. So far as I am concerned, I am willing to let it rest with the article and with the Senator's explanation. I assume that that will be satisfactory to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. KENNEDY. Not quite as satisfactory as it was a moment ago; but in that case I yield the floor.

ENROLLED BILL PRESENTED

The Secretary of the Senate reported that on today, May 23, 1960, he presented to the President of the United States the enrolled bill (S. 44) to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to construct the San Luis unit of the Central Valley project, California, to enter into an agreement with the State of California with respect to the construction and operation of such unit, and for other purposes.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10 A.M.
TOMORROW

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I move that the Senate stand in adjournment, in accordance with the order previously entered, until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 6 o'clock and 23 minutes p.m.) the Senate, under the previous order, adjourned until tomorrow, Tuesday, May 24, 1960, at 10 o'clock a.m.

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day. That is the sole purpose—a raw, partisan, political effort, which the American public will see through and quickly understand.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield to me?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield, to permit the Senator from Illinois to make a response.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I wish to say to my distinguished friend, the Senator from Colorado, that I am not afraid of anybody or anything. I started out with a very mild expository statement on the subject of crowbars. That is where I started, and that is where I tried to wind up.

Mr. CARROLL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. CARROLL. The Senator from Illinois started with a crowbar and a sledge hammer, but he tried to put the junior Senator from Massachusetts between the hammer and the anvil—a raw, partisan, political piece of chicanery. But the Senator from Illinois will not succeed; the American people will not permit him to do that.

Mr. DIRKSEN. But I love the Senator from Massachusetts too much to do that under any circumstances.

Mr. CARROLL. Then why did not the Senator from Illinois abide by the Senate rules?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Because I was talking about Adlai.

Mr. CARROLL. If the minority leader was talking about Adlai, the Senator from Illinois, who is one of the most skilled politicians in the business—

Mr. DIRKSEN. I thank the Senator.

Mr. CARROLL. I mean that sincerely; and the able junior Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT], formerly national chairman of the Republican Party, is another skilled politician. Are they now asking us to believe that they were not trying to "put the tag" on the junior Senator from Massachusetts? I warn you, the American people will not believe it.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I can only say to my good friend that his party has not yet had its convention. What we are interested in is what we are going to do to his party in November. We do not know what member of his party will receive the nomination of his party. We have our candidate, and we are going to win in November.

So we are not playing favorites as between all the candidates his party has. We simply want to make sure that the record is clear, and that any "anvils" are kept out of it—because I did not refer to any "anvil"; I referred only to sledge hammers and crowbars.

So I wish to be sure, always, that when they talk about sledge hammers and crowbars, they are talking about a fellow who lived on the land, and knows what a crowbar is, and knows what a sledge hammer is, and knows what they are used for, and how they are used, and has used both of those instrumentalities a great many times.

Mr. KENNEDY. Let me say that the Senator from Illinois seems to suggest that this type of campaign technique

of suggesting that Senators are guilty of a suspicion of appeasement, and are "turnquotes," and so forth—

Mr. DIRKSEN. Oh, Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. Does not the Senator feel that this type of debate will not make a great contribution to the discussion of the issues?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Let me say this never would have happened if Governor Stevenson had left one phrase or one clause out of the statement he made to the \$100 dinner in Cook County, last Thursday night. There, he said, after the recital of unity and then the responsibility of his party to inform the country, this administration could not carry on these negotiations with the Russians, involving the survival of the country, and had to be taken out of power. And if that is not politics, then I do not know the meaning of the word.

Mr. KENNEDY. It is disloyal. That is what it is; is it not?

Mr. DIRKSEN. What?

Mr. KENNEDY. Would you not be inclined to say that it is disloyal? Would that be the appropriate charge?

Mr. DIRKSEN. No; it is just plain politics, spelled with a capital "P." Having lived in this atmosphere for about 30 years, I think I know a political sentiment when I see it; and when it is in cold print, the English language does have a meaning.

Mr. KENNEDY. Let me ask the Senator from Illinois, who is quite precise, does the Senator see anything inappropriate or in contravention of the rules of the Senate in anything the Senator from Pennsylvania said?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I do not pass on that. I am not sitting up there in the chair. I am not the Parliamentarian.

Mr. KENNEDY. Does the Senator care to make a judgment on it?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I know of no reason why I should, particularly.

Mr. KENNEDY. The Senator is the "leader of the army."

Mr. DIRKSEN. I have high regard for the delicacy of the situation.

Mr. KENNEDY. I, myself, have the same reticence about commenting on it as the Senator from Illinois has.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I know the Senator from Massachusetts never would have made the statement Adlai made in Chicago. He certainly would have made a consistent appeal for unity, even as the majority leader and the acting majority leader have from time to time made on the floor of the Senate, and in which I have always been delighted to concur.

Mr. KENNEDY. Is it proper, then, to say the Senator from Illinois never would have used the words the Senator from Pennsylvania used?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I do not pass on that question. I can never pass on words I have not uttered or with which I have no particular connection. But I know what Adlai said, and I have to get back to crowbars. Someone made the crack about "eating crowbars." I thought that was a nifty expression and that we will hear more about it. But this was nothing more than a visitation on the

subject of crowbars and sledge hammers, and I tried to remain within it pretty much.

Mr. CARROLL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. CARROLL. I can understand the sensitiveness of the Senator from Illinois—

Mr. DIRKSEN. Oh, I am not sensitive. I am the least sensitive man in this body.

Mr. CARROLL. I can understand how he may have been wounded deeply, because here is a Member of the United States Senate who happens to be the brightest star that has been blazing across the political horizon. The implication is made that he is a turncoat through applying an invented phrase "turnquote" in connection with whether Senator KENNEDY asked for an apology or an expression of regret.

I want to ask the minority leader, who is a very experienced statesman and politician, was it an accident that the Senator from Illinois and the Senator from Pennsylvania got together on this subject, or was it for the purpose of cutting down the junior Senator from Massachusetts?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I had no idea who was going to be on the floor this noon. I did not know that the majority leader was not going to be here. I did not care. I do my own thinking, when I have a little time, and then I get all the material together, because I have no ghostwriters. I have no staff to get this material together for me. I do it myself.

Mr. CARROLL. The Senator from Illinois does not need ghostwriters.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I have not conferred with a single Member on our side or the side of the Senator from Colorado or with a person in any other place as to what was going to happen this afternoon. I had all my ducks in a row. I had 10 documents in a sheaf; and, like a good lawyer—and my friend is a good lawyer—when one goes before the judge, he lays it out and says, "Judge, here are the citations." I made the allegations, and then I gave the citations from Adlai Stevenson's speech on down; and it will be a pretty good campaign document, if that is the way Adlai wants it, because I wanted to be sure that everything, including the whole press dispatch from the Paris newspaper, and the questions and answers, will be there for reference when the time comes.

While I am about it, there was a question as to whether Mr. Robert Boulay, who was the author of this interview for the Paris paper, had an inadequate perception of the English language. Maybe so, but he is the Time-Life correspondent in Paris; and if he does not know English, I had better write Henry Luce a letter. [Laughter.]

Mr. CARROLL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes.

Mr. CARROLL. The Senator did this all by himself.

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apologize—that I was an appeaser—was a breach of the rules of the Senate.

Mr. DIRKSEN. That is the point I am getting at—whether I have treated the Senator from Massachusetts unfairly or not. Did I treat the Senator unfairly?

Mr. KENNEDY. I should say that the Senator from Illinois did not treat me unfairly. The Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT] did.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. SCOTT. I regret that the Senator from Massachusetts has resorted to what might be called guilt by association by bracketing me with some remark, with which I am not familiar, alleged to have been made by the Governor of New Hampshire. I hope he will not further follow those tactics.

Mr. KENNEDY. Bracketed only by party membership.

Mr. SCOTT. I regret it if I have at any time seemed to be unfair. If I have been unfair, the Senator from Massachusetts has my apology. I do not believe, myself, that I have been unfair.

The Senator's comment seems to be based upon the fact that while many Members of the Senate were in attendance in the Senate when it was called to order, and an item was put into the Record by the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], I made comments upon a matter already inserted in the Record.

If the Senator thinks that was unfair, I am sorry; and, first, I should like the Senator to be sure that he is quite fair, as I am certain he wishes to be. Following my statement to the Senator from Massachusetts—I refer to my statement that I did not suggest that he be investigated by anyone—he said the Senator from Pennsylvania demanded an investigation of the Senator from Massachusetts.

I say to the Senator from Massachusetts that is not a correct quotation of what I said; and I told him that that was not a correct quotation of what I said. However, even after I told him that that was not a correct quotation of what I said, he continued to advert to it.

Further, he admits that the exact words which appear in the article published in the Portland Oregonian were stated by him:

One was to apologize. I—

That is, the Senator from Massachusetts—

think that might have been possible to do.

If the Senator from Massachusetts thinks it might have been possible for President Eisenhower to apologize, how can the Senator from Massachusetts now say the phrase is taken out of context?

Mr. KENNEDY. In the first place, those words are not the precise words that came off the recorder this afternoon.

Mr. SCOTT. The Senator read the same words himself, as coming from his own remarks.

Mr. KENNEDY. The Senator should judge the statement in the context in which the answer was given, and that

context was accepted by every member of the press who was there.

Let me read my answer again:

He said there were two conditions for continuing: One, that we apologize. I think that that might have been possible to do; and that, second, we try those responsible for the flight.

The Senator from Pennsylvania stops his version with the words "might have been possible to do," and leaves the clear implication that, therefore, I said we should apologize.

What I said was that if Mr. Khrushchev had proposed the first condition alone—the apology—it was possible that Khrushchev and the President of the United States might have had a meeting of the minds—it was possible that some sort of an agreement might have been reached.

However, my answer went on that the second condition was obviously unacceptable because the flight was authorized by the Government and it was inconceivable that we would punish the men involved. Therefore Mr. Khrushchev knew it was a condition we could not meet, and by making it a condition of resuming the talks he clearly demonstrated that he intended to break off the summit conference. If he merely had asked that the United States express regret, that might have been a reasonable term, and would have indicated a willingness on his part to proceed.

It seems to me that I expressed this view quite clearly in what I said; and the Associated Press, the United Press, and other press agencies took that view. Furthermore, I stated my clarification of it, not at some later time, but in the same paragraph.

Therefore, I merely say that the record will speak for itself, and that I do not have to purge myself of any suspicion of appeasement.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield to me, so that I may, in fairness, make a statement?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. SCOTT. I have not said the Senator from Massachusetts was an appeaser. I said—as nearly as I can remember the words I used; the Senator from Massachusetts now has my notes—that I hoped he would take an opportunity to resist the suspicion of appeasement, which turns on the suggestion that Eisenhower should have apologized to Khrushchev.

The Senator from Massachusetts feels that that statement was taken out of context. I am perfectly willing to abide by the statement of the Senator from Massachusetts and by his own interpretation; and I make it quite clear to this body that I have not said, and I do not now say, the Senator from Massachusetts was an appeaser. I hope that will satisfy the sensitivity of the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. KENNEDY. Does the Senator from Pennsylvania still feel there is a suspicion of appeasement about me?

Mr. SCOTT. If the Senator from Massachusetts feels that he had no intention to appease by making the state-

ment, I will accept the Senator's version as my own.

Mr. KENNEDY. I appreciate the Senator's somewhat grudging response.

Mr. SCOTT. It is not grudging at all. I like the Senator from Massachusetts very much.

Mr. KENNEDY. I never thought the day would come when I would say Harold Stassen's judgment was not completely inaccurate. But I must say perhaps he was wiser than we knew, when he spoke the other day in Pennsylvania.

I think it comes with poor grace for Senators to refer to each other in derogatory terms.

Neither do I think Governor Stevenson has to appear before an investigating committee, in order to purge himself of the Senator from Pennsylvania's suspicions.

Mr. CARROLL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Moss in the chair). Does the Senator from Massachusetts yield to the Senator from Colorado?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. CARROLL. The able Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], the able Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT], the minority leader, the able Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], and the junior Senator from Colorado all served together in the House of Representatives. The Senator from Pennsylvania was at one time national chairman of the Republican Party. The minority leader, the distinguished Senator from Illinois, has a responsibility to support his President, no matter how fumbling the action taken may have been.

But to accuse the junior Senator from Massachusetts of appeasement, under the evidence I have heard here tonight, is not only unfair, it is ridiculous.

All that needs to be done is to analyze carefully what has been said, and then look at the political partisanship in back of it. It is clearly an attempt to strike down one of the foremost young political leaders in America today, in an attempt to give the impression that he is asking the President of the United States to apologize to Khrushchev, when implicit in every sentence of the statement the Senator from Massachusetts made was that the President might have expressed his regrets. What is wrong with that?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Oh, Mr. President—

Mr. CARROLL. I ask the Senator to let me finish, please.

All America would agree that that might have brought success to the Summit—which the President and his minority leader wanted, I am sure. There would have been nothing wrong with expressing regrets.

But Senators try to misinterpret the text of the statement the Senator made to make it appear as a request by the junior Senator from Massachusetts that an apology be made. What is this situation, Mr. President? It is a raw, partisan, political effort to put the Senator from Massachusetts at disadvantage, because they are afraid of the strength he is manifesting throughout the Nation to-

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one, on the other side of the aisle, used the "turncoat," I immediately rose to correct him; and the third time I rose to correct him, I used the word "turnquote." I enunciated it quite clearly.

So, although the Senator will have to forgive me if my accent failed at the time, I am certain the press clearly understood the word "turnquote."

It is not a word coined by me; it is not a word in the dictionary, because I have since looked it up; but it is a word commonly used. I have seen it in the newspapers and magazines. It is well known to the press. I may say, too, that the Senator has had many sad experiences with the use of the word.

Mr. KENNEDY. Let me read what I actually did say in Oregon, so that the Senator will be clear about it. This afternoon, after I had heard about the Senator's attack on me—and I would have been glad to discuss his accusations and my statement in Oregon with him, and even with the Senator from Illinois—I called the school in Oregon where I spoke and talked with Mr. Monroe, who is the principal of that school.

A recording of my remarks had been made. I will read what I said, because I think it throws some light on what my thoughts were. I made these statements in answer to questions asked by the students.

There was a series of questions from the students, dealing with the summit, and finally, although Mr. Monroe has only the answer and not the question on his tape—came the question to which I gave the answer which is being discussed here today.

But first let me read the two questions of the students which led to this question:

First, "Do you think the U-2 incident was handled properly by the Government?"

I do not think that the timing of the U-2 incident is defensible. I think it was obviously the wrong time. Engine failure is always a possibility. Every time we go up in a plane we have to realize that it may come down sooner than we thought. That being true, it seems to me that you always have to consider what the results of that failure will be, and therefore, you would have to consider that there is 1 chance in 5, and 1 in 10, and 1 in 100 chances that a flight a week before the summit would fail and, therefore, it was a risk you would not want to take at that particular time.

Then the next question evidently was whether I thought Mr. Khrushchev would have broken up the summit meeting if there had not been the U-2 flight. I said:

No, I don't think that it would have been abandoned. Except for the U-2 incident it would not have had a psychological argument for breaking up. Then the burden would have been his alone and while the summit may never have been a success, he never would have taken all the responsibility unless he had what he felt was an adequate provocation to justify his position before world opinion. He never would have taken on the burden himself.

Then, while as I have said, the next question is not recorded, Mr. Monroe's recollection was—and the answer which

I gave would seem to be responsive to it—that it was:

What would you have done if you had been Mr. Eisenhower?"

My response was:

Once the summit had broken up and once Mr. Khrushchev indicated his refusal to continue I don't think that the United States could—but—he said there were two conditions for continuing. One, that we apologize. I think that that might have been possible to do and that second, we try those responsible for the flight. We could not do that. It would be highly unfair because the flight had been authorized and therefore that was a condition Mr. Khrushchev knew we couldn't meet and therefore it indicated that he wanted to break (it) up. If he had merely asked that the United States should express regret then that would have been a reasonable term. To say we should try those involved—quite obviously that meant that he wanted to break it up and we had no alternative but to let him do so.

This statement is quite clear to me, at least, when taken in its context, and particularly taken in the context of the AP story of the same statement—which I have here. I have AP story as carried in the Des Moines Register. It says:

PORTLAND, OREG.—JOHN F. KENNEDY said * * * he would have expressed regret.

Then it says:

KENNEDY, campaigning here for votes in Oregon's presidential preference primary, said: "I certainly would express regret at the timing and give assurance that it would not happen again." He said, "I would express regret that the flight did take place."

Let me be a bit specific about this. It seems to me that my answer should be taken in its entirety and in its context. Among all the newspapermen who were present, including the representative of the Associated Press, no one deduced from my answer that I wanted the President to apologize to Khrushchev. And I did not say that the President should apologize. But I did state that, if necessary to keep the summit going, I would have been willing to express regret at the timing of the U-2 incident. And I do regret the timing because it helped lead to the question of the chances of a successful summit. It certainly lessened the prestige of the United States in the eyes of the world. It has helped destroy the prestige of the President in the eyes of the Russian people which was one of our greatest national assets. And it has given the impression that the President does not completely control some of the military or some of his intelligence officers.

So I would have expressed regret if such an expression would have kept the summit going. That does not make me in any way a party to appeasement. I do not have to come before any investigating committee to rid myself of the suspicion of appeasement. I am not a "turnquote." That statement is wholly inaccurate, because the total explanation of my entire position was in the one answer given to the schoolchildren, and was carried by the Associated Press.

I think this is a difficult time in the life of the United States. I think that quite obviously we on the Democratic

side who have a responsibility to suggest alternative courses of action to conduct an examination of our policies so that we may learn from past mistakes. After all, that is a function which the party of the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT] has assumed on many occasions in the past.

I have never abused the President personally. I do not now advocate a policy which I think would weaken the United States—nor have I ever advocated such a policy. Instead, year after year, I have stood on the floor of this Senate and voted for the appropriations and programs which would have made America stronger—defense appropriations and programs to build up the strength of our education, our economy, and our health. It is these things which are the real test of a desire for a strong America.

I say to the Senator from Pennsylvania, who has been a colleague of mine in both the House and the Senate, and to the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], that if the Senator had informed me in advance of his projected attack, I would have given him my entire statement, so that he might know my entire point of view.

Second, I am sure the Senator from Pennsylvania cannot justify his calling me an appeaser or cast a suspicion of appeasement on me. Once we begin to make that sort of charge—and I have already been attacked along a similar line by the Governor of New Hampshire—the great debate of the 1960 campaign will be doomed to become abusive rather than a fruitful discussion of the great problems which confront this Nation. * * *

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Does the Senator from Massachusetts regard the Oregonian as a substantial, solid newspaper?

Mr. KENNEDY. I do.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Does the Senator know Mr. Shoemaker?

Mr. KENNEDY. I do.

Mr. DIRKSEN. What is the Senator's estimate of Mr. Shoemaker?

Mr. KENNEDY. He is a good newspaperman.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Does the Senator believe he is a careful newspaperman?

Mr. KENNEDY. I do.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Does the Senator deny that Mr. Shoemaker, in the article which he read, and which I placed in the Record, said there was one thing which the Senator from Massachusetts said could be done, namely, that the President could apologize? Does the Senator deny that he used the word "apologize"? Does the Senator deny that statement, if Mr. Shoemaker is a good, competent newspaperman?

Mr. KENNEDY. I am attempting to present my entire answer. I had hoped that when I had presented the entire answer, the Senator from Illinois, with his customary judicious, fair nature, would recognize that any implication that I had said the President should

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us from the other body, but also above the budget estimates. We increased the appropriation over \$3 million above the budget estimates in this field. We intend to move forward, and we would be delighted to receive the suggestions of the distinguished Senator from Kansas and will give very careful consideration to any suggestions from him as to further progress we may make in this field. It is one of the few areas in which we have been able to do anything for the American farmer.

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, I rise to pay my respects to the distinguished chairman of the committee, the senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], and the committee for what I believe is a foresighted and a proper program for not only dealing in research of questions relating to wheat but also an agricultural commodities, because, as the distinguished chairman of the committee well knows, all of them are under pressure, and we need not only to provide the proper type of market for products but to find new uses for the products.

Mr. RUSSELL. I did not wish to go into the field of utilization research. We endeavored to increase the appropriation in that area, but despite the advances in the past several years we still have a long way to go in the study of soils, the conservation of water, and other related studies which not only assist in the production of crops, but which will also help in the preservation of the fertility of our soils for generations unborn.

Mr. SCHOEPPPEL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.

Mr. SCHOEPPPEL. I am very glad to join with my colleague in his commendation of what the committee has done with reference not only to research but also, the matter about which Dean Weber of Kansas State University consulted us, which was a research fund with reference to a study that was made. Did I correctly understand the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] to say that that research program will be continued and that funds will be made available for it?

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes. The Senator's colleague asked about the item which has to do with rural electrification research, which the budget recommended be discontinued.

Mr. SCHOEPPPEL. The Senator is correct.

Mr. RUSSELL. Through the reapplication of funds, as the bill now stands and comes before the Senate, it provides for that work to be done for another year at Manhattan, Kans.

Mr. SCHOEPPPEL. I thank the distinguished Senator and the members of the committee for that consideration because, as I understood from the reports that we had, that was in its completion stage, and provision should be made for completing it.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. I am glad to yield to the fighting friend of agriculture, the distinguished Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. YOUNG. I thank my friend from Georgia for those kind comments. The bill as approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee I believe represents a reasonable approach to the many involved agricultural problems. I wish to commend the Senator from Georgia for his usual good job in the handling of the bill. Not all farm organizations and other groups got all they wanted, but I think the adjustments made in the bill were necessary ones and the ones which will please the great majority of the Members of Congress as well as people generally.

As the Senator pointed out, there were only two sizable increases in the appropriation bill, and those were necessary ones which had to be made because a point of order was raised on the House floor on the ground that contracts had been entered into regarding the conservation reserve program. The remainder of the increases made by the Senate committee were very worthy ones involving, for example, increases in loan authorizations for REA and RTA, some research items, and some other adjustments. On the whole, as I said previously, I think it is now a very good bill and one which should provoke very little debate on the Senate floor.

Mr. RUSSELL. I thank the Senator. I think the bill is as well balanced as we can make it in these times.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. I wish merely to take time enough to commend both the chairman of the Agricultural Appropriations Subcommittee and the ranking member of the committee and the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. YOUNG] on the excellent job they did in respect to the Agricultural Appropriation bill, not only this year but for several years last passed, and ever since I have had the privilege of being a member of the subcommittee. I believe the fact that American agriculture is now the best in the whole world is due largely to the foresight and the attention which these 2 men on the subcommittee, composed of able Senators, in particular have given to our requirements.

I become a little tired when I hear people complain because we have enough to eat and wear in this country and a little besides. We can imagine what the situation would be today if we did not have a good supply of wheat, feed grains, and other farm commodities on hand. What happened at the summit conference would have been almost a minor matter compared with what would happen if we became a deficit agricultural country. We could not stand up. The attention given to the preservation of our soil and water resources by the committee headed by the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] has been outstanding. If we do not take care of our soil and water resources in this country, it will not make a bit of difference how many missiles we have, or how far they will shoot, because we shall be the underdog in any international controversy which may arise.

I am glad to take this opportunity to thank these leaders of American agri-

culture who have done such outstanding work.

Mr. RUSSELL. I wish to express to the distinguished Senator from Vermont, for myself, and for the distinguished Senator from North Dakota [Mr. YOUNG] our deep appreciation for his complimentary references. It was a very happy and fortuitous day for the Appropriations Subcommittee when the distinguished Senator from Vermont came to be an ex officio member and brought to the committee the results of his years of experience on the standing Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, as well as his sympathetic interest in the problems of American agriculture, the future of our soils, and in the preservation of our resources.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, the livestock producers in Texas suffer tremendous losses each year from screw-worm infestation, and there is a tremendous need for an eradication program in the Southwest similar to that which has so effectively brought the screw-worm under control in the Southeastern part of the country. The distinguished chairman of the subcommittee will remember that I brought this situation to his attention last year, and I was pleased to see that on page 3 of the committee report the committee took cognizance of the menace facing the livestock producers in the Southwest and requested the Department to investigate the feasibility of developing an eradication program and to report to the committee on the feasibility and requirements for such a program.

I have explained to my constituents that the committee would expect the Department to act on this request in the near future, and in any event in time for the report to be considered by the committee during the next session of the Congress, when it considers the appropriation for the Department of Agriculture appropriation for the fiscal year 1962.

I inquire of the distinguished Senator from Georgia if that is his understanding of what the committee had in mind when it included this language in the committee report on page 3?

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes. The distinguished Senator from Texas urged the committee last year and again this year to consider the interest of the livestock producers of Texas and the Southwest in the eradication program. We know as a matter of common knowledge that the screw-worm has caused heavy losses to those livestock producers.

A number of producers wrote to members of the committee. Judge Montague, who headed the Livestock Producers Association for many years, discussed the matter with me. I have canvassed the subject informally with the Department and they have advised me there are a number of problems which would require intensive research and planning before they would undertake to start an eradication program such as was applied in the Southeast.

The committee has directed the Department to investigate this matter fully and we certainly expect to have a report on this subject not later than the time

the Department of Agriculture budget is submitted for fiscal year 1962.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I thank the Senator for his complete response to my inquiry. I am very grateful for the interest he always shows to the solution of problems in our section of the country.

FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I note that the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT] and the Senator from Illinois are in the Chamber. This afternoon the Senator from Pennsylvania made some statements on the floor of the Senate with regard to some statements of mine, as follows:

I might also add, in connection with the statement of the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. KENNEDY, as reported in the Portland Oregonian, that the Senator himself said:

"Khrushchev laid down two conditions to President Eisenhower for going on with the summit meeting. One was to apologize. I think that might have been possible to do."

Then the quotation goes on to other matters.

The report in that Oregonian is that: "Later KENNEDY modified the word 'apologize,' and said the President might 'express regret.'"

"It is my hope—

The Senator from Pennsylvania went on to say—

that neither the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts nor that other candidate for the Presidency, Governor Stevenson, will—either one of them—brand himself as a "turncoat." It is my hope that they will relieve themselves of the curse of suspicion of appeasement, and it is my hope that the unity, which started out so well in support of the President and in support of the administration, may somehow be found again."

Now let me quote from an Associated Press dispatch headed "Summit," which I have just taken from the news ticker, as follows:

SCOTT replied heatedly that he had not called them appeasers. But he said quotations attributed to them indicated to him they wanted to follow a soft line in dealing with the Russians. He said they should be called before an investigating committee to testify on their views.

Mr. President, is the Senator from Pennsylvania suggesting that I be called before an investigating committee?

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. SCOTT. If the Senator will continue to read my notes and other notes which other Senators made, he will note that I did not suggest that he be called before an investigating committee. I suggested that Mr. Boulay, the author of the French newspaper article, be called to testify if the committee saw fit, with respect to the interview which he allegedly had with Governor Stevenson, and that Governor Stevenson be invited to appear to give his version of the interview.

At another point I said that I see no objection to an investigation of all the facts involving American foreign policy if the Committee on Foreign Relations wished to make such an investigation, and that it might call all the witnesses

it wanted to call, including Mr. Boulay and Mr. Stevenson.

I have reread my own notes, and I do not recall at any point ever suggesting that the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, for whom I have a very high regard, as he knows, be asked to appear before any investigating committee. To that extent the Associated Press statement, as read by the Senator from Massachusetts, does not seem to follow the RECORD in the Senate.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I will ask the Senator if he believes that I am under suspicion of appeasement?

Mr. SCOTT. On the contrary; I suggested that the Senator from Massachusetts may relieve himself—and I made the suggestion in good will—of the suspicion of appeasement.

I made reference to a newspaper article printed in the Portland Oregonian, written by Mr. Marvin Shoemaker, which quotes the Senator as saying:

Khrushchev laid down two conditions to President Eisenhower for going on with the summit meeting. One was to apologize.

Then the report in the Oregonian stated:

Later KENNEDY modified the word "apologize," and said the President might "express regret."

I may say that if the Senator from Massachusetts feels that President Eisenhower should apologize to Khrushchev, as first reported in the paper, that he now has an opportunity—and I am very hopeful indeed that he will use it—to relieve himself of any suspicion of appeasement, because in my opinion it would be appeasement to have the President apologize. If, however, the Senator's later explanation, with respect to expressing regrets, which he made in Oregon, is correct, and he was misquoted—then, in my mind, it does not qualify him in accordance with my previous remarks.

Mr. KENNEDY. Has the Senator from Pennsylvania any other source, besides the newspaper in Oregon, of the statement which he later said was a misquotation?

Mr. SCOTT. My only source is the newspaper publication itself, and that the byline is by Mr. Marvin Shoemaker, the political writer of the Portland Oregonian. If the Senator is prepared to say that he made none of these statements, and that the newspaper writer is incorrect or made an error in having attributed it to the Senator, I will be very glad indeed to take note of what the Senator says.

Mr. KENNEDY. And from what paper did the Senator get the statement that I had been misquoted?

Mr. SCOTT. I believe the context states that the Senator from Massachusetts made the statement:

"Khrushchev laid down two conditions to President Eisenhower for going on with the summit meeting. One was to apologize."

Later KENNEDY modified the word "apologize," and said the President might "express regret."

The newspaper article indicates that the Senator himself modified the earlier remark. To be entirely fair, I repeat

that, if he did not make the first remark or if he did not make the second remark, I am very happy that those remarks were not made.

Mr. KENNEDY. Does not the Senator think it would have been more in keeping with Senate rule XIX if he had informed me that he was going to make an attack on me?

Mr. SCOTT. I may say to the Senator that it is not always possible to know when the Senator from Massachusetts is available, and that because of the Senator's other obligations, this is probably more true of him than of many other Members of the Senate, and we fully understand it and are in accord with the reasons for the Senator's absences. Further, my remarks were made subsequent to the remarks made by the distinguished minority leader. At the time I rose I had not fully made up my mind as to what references I might make to the material which had already been inserted in the RECORD by the the minority leader, including the news item to which I have referred. It occurred at the convening of the Senate today. Certainly I did not intend any discourtesy to the Senator from Massachusetts. However, it is virtually impossible to know when the name of the Senator from Massachusetts will be mentioned in the Senate. That is not the fault of the Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. KENNEDY. I consider it to be completely the fault of the Senator from Pennsylvania. This is not just another mention of my name. It is a unique situation. I do not recall that any other Senator has ever made the suggestion that I come before the Senate or before an investigating committee to purge myself of the suspicion of appeasement. Certainly the courtesy of advance notice should have been extended to the Senator from Massachusetts by the Senator from Pennsylvania, especially when his remarks were coming close to being a violation of rule XIX, part 2, which states:

No Senator in debate shall, directly or indirectly, by any form of words impute to another Senator or to other Senators any conduct or motive unworthy or unbecoming a Senator.

The actual record of the Official Reporter uses the word "turncoat." I am aware of the fact that the Senator from Pennsylvania may well have coined an original phrase on later consideration, or he may have made it at that time. But his accentuation was not distinct, and the Official Reporter took down the word "turncoat."

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a correction, because the Senator is proceeding on a line which is not in accordance with what actually happened? Will the Senator yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. SCOTT. I call the Senator's attention to the fact that I had written down on a newspaper at the time, on one of the desks here, the word "turncoat" before I spoke it. It was clearly understood in the gallery and was so recorded on the first teletype report of my original remarks; that when some-

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<p>Remarks:</p> <p>Attached is an excerpt from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD containing a list of questions which Senator Lausche says he will pose during the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing. A copy has been sent to Mr. Bissell.</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 60px; width: 300px; margin: 10px auto;"></div> <p align="right">Assistant Legislative Counsel</p>					
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MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE—ENROLLED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS SIGNED

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Maurer, one of its reading clerks, announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills and joint resolutions, and they were signed by the Vice President:

S. 2130. An act to authorize a payment to the Government of Japan;

H.R. 9465. An act to authorize the loan of one submarine to Canada and the extension of a loan of a naval vessel to the Government of the Republic of China;

H.R. 9818. An act to provide for the conveyance of certain real property of the United States to the State of Florida;

H.R. 10809. An act to authorize appropriations to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for salaries and expenses, research and development, construction and equipment, and for other purposes;

H.J. Res. 502. Joint resolution authorizing the erection in the District of Columbia of a memorial to Mary McLeod Bethune; and

H.J. Res. 546. Joint resolution authorizing the Architect of the Capitol to present to the Senators and Representatives in the Congress from the State of Hawaii the official flag of the United States bearing 50 stars which is first flown over the west front of the U.S. Capitol.

LAUNCHING BY UNITED STATES TODAY OF 2½-TON MIDAS EARTH SATELLITE

Mr. BRIDGES. Mr. President, some very interesting news has just come over the wire. We hear so much criticism and so much talk about failures of the United States, about the missile race, the satellite race, the gap in the air, and so on, that I think the Senate should take due notice of this event.

I read from a news dispatch dated today:

CAPE CANAVERAL.—The United States launched a 2½-ton Midas earth satellite today to test a spy-in-the-sky system for detecting hostile missiles within seconds after they are fired.

An 88-foot, two-stage Atlas-Agena blasted from the cape at 12:37 p.m., e.s.t. (1:37 p.m. e.d.t.) with the limousine-sized moonlet. The rumble may echo in diplomatic halls.

The satellite, dubbed Midas II and essentially a repeat of a shot which failed February 26, was equipped with a super-cooled infrared sensor to spot missile launchings from an orbit about 300 miles above earth.

The space-borne alarm system, peering over thousands of square miles each second, would give America a 30-minute warning of an impending missile onslaught. This is about twice the warning time available with present radar systems.

The Air Force planned to test the satellite with flares fired at Edwards Air Force Base and Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., this week. It also was reported the Air Force might time the launchings of intercontinental ballistic missiles to coincide with a pass by Midas II.

Sources said the flares will be seen as a rosy glow over a radius of 50 miles. Scientists also said the satellite would be able to tell the difference between missile firings and other heat sources on earth.

Midas—short for missile defense alarm system—is the first step in a top-secret U.S. military plan for an international open skies arrangement of its own, hinged on space

satellites circling in polar orbits above every inch of earth's surface.

In the three-part system, Midas satellites will pick up enemy missile firings almost instantaneously. Samos reconnaissance satellites will get television views of military installations and Advent communications satellites will relay the information to U.S. authorities.

Operational versions of the spy satellites may be in the skies in groups of about one dozen within 2 years.

Midas II—last of the series to be launched here—was a prototype designed to see whether the alarm system will work. It was aimed toward an orbit that would carry it over a comparatively narrow band around the Equator, but not over Russian territory.

The big rocket eased from its pad slowly at first as its 360,000-pound thrust engines built up power. This was the same propulsion system which drove an Atlas missile a record 9,000 miles last week.

The Atlas was to drop away after burn-out. Then 10 minutes of coasting and after that, the firing of the bullet-shaped Agena section to drive the satellite into orbit.

During the coasting phase two small helium jets perform their task of getting the satellite into proper position with its nose pointing to earth and putting the payload into an orbit as nearly circular as possible.

The instrument package weighed more than 3,000 pounds, largest ever sent into space by a U.S. rocket. The instruments and the second-stage casing were designed to remain attached for a gross weight of about 5,000 pounds.

The planned orbit would carry Midas II 28 degrees north and south of the Equator—as far north as Cape Canaveral and the southern section of Red China and as far south as the southern tips of Brazil and Africa.

The complex satellite was secret but the key to its success lay in the performance of the deep-frozen "eye" which was designed to spot a missile by infrared radiations from its exhaust.

Mr. President, I think that is one of the most gratifying and one of the most successful things we have achieved since we have been part of the space age, and certainly since the Russians sent up the first sputnik in October 1957.

We hear a great deal about the failures of the United States of America. The minute a missile which is fired from Cape Canaveral fails, the information is hurled all over this country and all over the world. The Russians advertise only their successes, and conceal their failures.

All along during the last few months, and in the last 2 or 3 years, we have heard never a word about any failure of the Russians, but we have always heard of their successes. I think it is time to talk about some of the American successes. One of our successes was the 9,000-mile shot of the Atlas missile the other day. Today, Midas II, which is a tremendous step forward, a step of which all Americans can be proud, is another of our great successes.

QUESTIONS FOR RUSSIA TO ANSWER

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, when the Foreign Relations Committee hears representatives of the State Department and others on the developments which took place in connection with the contemplated summit meeting, I will wish to

get the answers to the following questions:

First. To what extent has the Soviet Union been spying in the United States, West Germany, and other nations?

Second. How many times it has breached its commitments to other nations in the world—especially the captive nations?

Third. Is there a difference between spying by foot on land on the one hand, and by plane in the air on the other?

Fourth. Is it in the interest of our country that we abandon the general and traditional methods of acquiring intelligence?

Fifth. If we do so, what are the probabilities of the Soviet Union following a similar course?

Sixth. Why did the Communists break their treaty with the Poles in World War II and stab the Poles in the back while the latter were fighting the Nazis?

Seventh. What are the details concerning the brutal massacre of Polish soldiers by the Communists in the Katyn forests?

Eighth. Why, in World War II, did the Reds, while advancing westward and nearing Poland, induce the Polish people of Warsaw to heroically rebel against the Nazi occupiers and then abandon them to slaughter by the Nazis?

Ninth. Why did the Soviet break its pledged word that the people of the satellite nations, under free and open elections, would be permitted to choose the type of government they wanted?

Tenth. Why did the Soviet aid and induce the Red Chinese to use their military power against South Korea, resulting in death and injury to thousands of American boys?

Eleventh. Why did the Soviet encourage the Red Chinese in the bombardment and killing of innocent people at the Quemoy and Matsu Islands?

Twelfth. What is the explanation for the mass and merciless murder of the freedom fighters of Hungary, Poland, and East Germany, who were fighting for liberation in those respective countries?

I do not contemplate, as a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, allowing a crafty leader of a Communist government to point the finger of suspicion and guilt toward our Nation, when the hands of that person are dripping with the blood of innocent people.

THE RIGHT TO CRITICIZE

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, it was almost 10 years ago on June 1, 1950, when I made what ultimately was referred to as the "declaration of conscience." In that statement I stated my disagreement with some segments of my own Republican Party on certain political tactics. In that statement I said that I believed in certain basic rights—among them being the right to criticize, the right to protest and the right of independent thought.

I still believe in those rights—and that the Democrats should have them in the fullest extent for criticizing the Republican administration. I do not believe that anyone should have to

appear, out of loyalty, to condone behavior with which he takes issue.

I believe that the Republican administration is subject to criticism on the handling of the U-2 affair—and consequently fair game politically for the Democrats. I do not believe the Democrats should be silenced by a loyalty gag.

Instead I believe that full and open discussion is in the best interest of our country and our people. I believe that honestly expressed difference of opinion—constructively expressed difference of opinion—should never be smothered. I believe that the opposition party has the obligation to criticize that with which it does not agree.

I believe that private citizens are to be commended for speaking their minds whether by letters to the newspapers, publicly, or by letters to their Senators and Representatives.

Yes, Mr. President, I believe in speaking up when I disagree with the President of the United States even though he be the head of the political party of which I am a member. I have done it in the past. I have done it today in voting to override his veto of the depressed areas bill. I shall do it in the future.

But, Mr. President, in my belief in the full right to disagree and criticize, I do not believe that President Eisenhower has disgraced the United States, as was implied on the floor of the Senate yesterday.

I do not believe that the overwhelming majority of the people of Maine believe that President Eisenhower has disgraced the United States, as was implied on the floor of the Senate yesterday.

Nor do I believe in publicizing and upholding the slur made upon the President of the United States, as was done yesterday on the floor of the Senate, with the reading into the Record of the statement that "we had better start electing Presidents who are young enough to keep their wits until they finish their terms." Nor do I believe that the overwhelming majority of the people of Maine subscribe to such a slurring statement against the President of the United States.

I believe that the administration is subject to criticism on the handling of the U-2 affair. But I want no part of slurring statements charging the President with disgracing the United States, and reflecting upon his mentality.

AGRICULTURAL AND FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION APPROPRIATIONS, 1961

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 12117) making appropriations for the Department of Agriculture and Farm Credit Administration for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1961, and for other purposes.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, if I may have the attention of the Senator from Georgia, unfortunately an emergency matter has arisen which will take me from the floor of the Senate, and I have

a statement on the agriculture bill which I shall ask to insert in the Record. However, there happens to be one special question which I would like to have answered by the Senator from Georgia.

Mr. RUSSELL. I shall be glad to answer the question if I can.

Mr. MORSE. May I say now, as I said in my statement, that there is not a single Senator who does not appreciate the wonderful work which the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] has done on the agricultural appropriation, as he has done in so many years past.

Mr. RUSSELL. I thank the distinguished Senator from Oregon for that commendation.

Mr. MORSE. In the course of my statement I would have observed:

"I am happy to see that the committee has seen fit to institute a pilot program for estimates on tomatoes and celery. In this connection I can only express my hope again to the distinguished chairman of the subcommittee that this action this year may break the logjam which has precluded the Department of Agriculture from submitting requests for funds to provide crop reports upon our cane and bushberry production. Can the chairman provide me with any suggestions as to how those of us who recognize the importance of these small fruits to the agricultural economy of our States, may further impress the Department with our needs in this area?"

Mr. RUSSELL. The distinguished Senator from Oregon will recall that last year, I believe, we included some funds in the appropriation bill for this purpose.

Mr. MORSE. That is correct.

Mr. RUSSELL. The Department has taken a rather dim view of the proposal.

The department officials seem to be very dubious about the value and the necessity for it. All that we have been able to get from them is a statement that they would furnish us with a report as to the yearend production, and would begin developing a plan for a reporting service that they would submit if the Congress desired to adopt a more complete program.

Mr. MORSE. There is no question about the fact that the chairman of the subcommittee has made clear that he thinks we should have such reports.

Mr. RUSSELL. Last year the subcommittee added language in the committee report that within the amount provided in the bill, that the Department should institute this program. The matter was brought up in the hearings again this year, and we were told that they would make yearend reports as to the total production and would submit to us next year some plan for a reporting service.

Mr. MORSE. I thank the Senator from Georgia very much. I intend to continue to press for Agricultural Department approval of this request. In my state it is of importance.

The people in the fruit and berry industry of my State, in my judgment, are entitled to this service from our Department of Agriculture. Again I wish to thank the Senator from Georgia for the assistance he has been to us. I am pleased to repeat on the floor of the Senate what I have said to farm groups in Oregon, that we have not a better

friend in the Senate Committee on Agriculture than the Senator from Georgia, the chairman of the subcommittee, and I am sure he will do everything he can to be of assistance to us in getting the reports we have been pleading for.

Mr. RUSSELL. I am grateful to the Senator for his remarks. Because of the condition in which the farmers of this country find themselves today, there is very little Congress can do for them. Therefore, I have felt a greater desire to assist them in such ways as I can in the appropriation bill in view of the fact that we have been unable to secure the two-thirds vote necessary to enact new legislation over the President's vetoes.

Mr. MORSE. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the Record at this point in my remarks the statement I prepared to use in the debate this afternoon.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR MORSE

The distinguished Senator from Georgia and his colleagues have earned our thanks for having improved the agricultural appropriations bill in many particulars as the result of their study. Those of us who hail from the Western States particularly would commend the increases which have been provided for soil and water research and facility needs. The increase of \$495,800 for this program for operating funds and the \$200,000 for the development of plans and specifications for needed construction at existing facilities are sound expenditures.

The \$25,000 for a further step-up in the sheep scabies eradication program and the \$19 million provided for brucellosis eradication will both be welcomed by many Oregon farmers. Likewise the committee action to restore the full amount of the budget request for State experiment stations is laudable. Even though the increase for this purpose is over a million dollars more than allowed by the House, it is justifiable.

The Extension Service increase of \$1.13 million over the budget reflects a confidence in the importance of this vital program which is shared by a great many of us who have profited by the advice and counsel of our own extension agents. I am particularly gratified that the committee is recommending \$250,000 over the budget estimate to permit the staffing of 20 additional soil conservation districts. Letters from every part of my State have told me of the difficulty faced by existing districts as SCS personnel were spread thin to service the districts being newly organized. Small watershed protection funds, a million and a quarter over the budget estimate, and \$9,250,000 over fiscal 1960 will be of great help in protecting this most important natural resource.

The \$18 million provided by both House and Senate for flood prevention work in the 11 authorized watersheds, is \$3 million more than the Bureau of the Budget was willing to recommend. Here, too, in my judgment the committee took action in the public interest.

The Agricultural Marketing Service recommendations of the committee, especially those relating to accelerating the lamb-on-feed reports will be particularly important to many sheepmen of our Western area.

Both the Rural Electrification Administration and the Farmers Home Administration increases are to be commended highly. The services provided by these agencies to our farmers are among the finest contributions made by any of the farm agencies. Both agencies have in the past striven to help the farmer to help himself in the im-

WEEK IN REVIEW

Moscow vs. Washington

This was a day-by-day account of how the dramatic story unfolded:

Thursday, May 5. Khrushchev carefully sets the stage for an announcement that electrifies the Supreme Soviet—an American plane has been shot down over Soviet Union. In an effort to trap the United States into a false denial, Khrushchev withholds details. The U. S. falls into the trap. The National Aeronautics and Space Agency says one of its weather research planes is missing on a flight in Turkey and suggests it may accidentally have strayed over the Soviet border.

Friday, May 6. Khrushchev lets the American story stand as the Russians stage protest meetings over plane incident. Indignation rises in U. S. over Soviet charges as State Department entangles itself still further with declaration that there has never been any deliberate attempt to violate Soviet air space.

Saturday, May 7. Khrushchev springs the trap. He discloses that pilot Powers is alive and has confessed to espionage after being shot down over Sverdlovsk on a flight that began in Pakistan and was to end in Norway. State Department is silent for several hours. Then, in effect, it acknowledges that U. S. planes have been spying on Russia but says no flight as described by Khrushchev was authorized by officials in Washington.

Sunday. Dismay is expressed in Allied capitals and in Washington over the timing of the Powers mission, the false U. S. denial and the implication that the President was not aware of the flight.

Monday. Khrushchev heightens the pressure with a warning of rocket attacks on U. S. foreign bases used for air intelligence missions. Herter indicates flights will continue and reverses the previous disclaimer of Eisenhower's responsibility.

Tuesday. U. S. vows to defend allies if Russians attack bases. Moscow protests plane flight in formal note to U. S. and says Powers will be tried as spy.

Eisenhower Comments

Wednesday. Volume and intensity of the dialogue between Washington and Moscow increases. Eisenhower says intelligence activities are vital to free world's survival. He says he directed that program be carried out in every "feasible" way. Khrushchev holds impromptu press conference in Moscow at display of wreckage of Powers' plane and equipment. In remarks held up by Soviet censors for twenty-four hours, then released, Khrushchev warns spying could lead to nuclear war. He casts doubt on whether Eisenhower would still be welcome in Moscow.

Thursday. In an effort to take some of the heat out of the controversy, the U. S. dispatches a note to Moscow declaring there had been no "aggressive intent" behind the flights over the Soviet Union. Eisenhower indicates he still plans to go to Moscow unless Khrushchev withdraws the invitation.

Friday. Moscow cancels visit of Soviet Air Force chief to U. S. because of charged atmosphere. It sends protests to Turkey, Pakistan and Norway over U. S. air reconnaissance from their bases. Norway protests to U. S. over Powers' reported plan to land at Norwegian base.

Saturday. Khrushchev, on arrival in Paris for the summit meeting, says in an obvious allusion to the U-2 incident that "certain military interests" are trying to continue the cold war. Russia warns Canada against permitting U. S. planes to fly intelligence missions from Canadian bases.

What Powers' fate will be is not known outside Russia. Khrushchev said he would be tried "severely" as a spy—a charge that in Russia is punishable by seven to fifteen years' imprisonment or by death.

The Russians have not produced Mr. Powers in public, although they have indicated they might stage a press conference for him.

The U. S. Embassy in Moscow has asked to be allowed to see Mr. Powers but the Russians have not said whether they would grant the request.

NEW YORK TIMES

22 May 1960

"WEEK IN REVIEW"

Week of Tumult

This is a day-by-day account of the momentous week.

SUNDAY

The shadow of the U-2 hangs over Paris as Premier Khrushchev, President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Macmillan and President de Gaulle make final preparations for their long-awaited summit conference. Khrushchev, in the preceding week, had roundly denounced the United States for sending the U-2 on an espionage flight over Russia and reacted even more strongly to implications by Secretary of State Herter and Eisenhower that such flights might continue. Now, in private conversations with Macmillan and de Gaulle, Khrushchev gives his price for participating in

the summit conference: the United States must call off over-flights of Russia; apologize for the past acts of "aggression"; and punish those responsible for them. The President, when apprised of the Khrushchev terms, informs Macmillan and de Gaulle that the over-flights have been suspended and will not be resumed. But he rejects the other. Khrushchev terms which amount, in effect, to a demand that Eisenhower punish himself. The reply is conveyed to Khrushchev.

The U. S. orders a world-wide alert of its armed forces.

Khrushchev rejects a request by Macmillan's aide to meet with him. Instead, on a session with ministers and aides present. The four leaders, accompanied by eighteen other officials, assemble around a huge round table in the green-draped cabinet room of the Elysée Palace. The seating order around the table is: de Gaulle, Khrushchev, Eisenhower and Macmillan. Khrushchev is flanked by Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovsky and Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko. There is no exchange of pleasantries or handshakes. The atmosphere is tense.

Khrushchev asks for the floor immediately after brief introductory remarks by de Gaulle and launches into a bitter denunciation of Eisenhower and the United States. His manner is curt, rude and defiant. He repeats his three demands on the over-flights, accuses Eisenhower of "treachery" and a "bandit" policy and says that in the circumstances Russia cannot participate in negotiations "of even those questions which have matured." He startles his listeners with the statement that the U-2 incident deeply involves "internal politics" in the Soviet Union and he suggests that the summit conference be postponed for six to eight months in the hope that "another" United States Government will understand the futility of "pursuing aggressive policy."

Withdraws Invitation

Khrushchev winds up the unprecedented face-to-face attack on Eisenhower by withdrawing the invitation to the President to visit the Soviet Union, originally scheduled for June 10.

Eisenhower sits tight-lipped and grim through the hour-long speech and translation. Then, in measured tones and with an obvious attempt to control his temper ("He was not just angry; he was absolutely furious," aides reported later) he reminds Khrushchev of the pledge that the over-flights are not to be resumed, but says the Soviet "ultimatum" will never be acceptable to the United States.

Macmillan and de Gaulle, in an effort to save the summit conference, plead with Khrushchev not to publish his speech. Khrushchev replies that he will publish his statement in full at the time of his own choosing. Within an hour it is released to the world press.

In the evening, Macmillan calls on Khrushchev in a last ditch attempt to salvage the summit meeting. "I appealed to him not to make impossible the negotiations on which all our hopes depend," Macmillan later told the House of Commons. "I was not without hope that the situation would take a more favorable turn."

TUESDAY

Macmillan's hope proves groundless. The climax of the conference is played out in a scene that might

be comic if its overtones were not so tragic. The Western Big Three assemble at the Elysée Palace at 3 P. M. in response to a formal invitation from de Gaulle for a summit session. Khrushchev is not there. He is off touring the French countryside, chopping wood and joking with farmers. A Khrushchev aide telephones to find out whether Eisenhower is ready to apologize for the over-flights and punish those responsible; otherwise Khrushchev will not attend the session. De Gaulle dispatches motorcycle riders to try to obtain from Khrushchev a reply in writing to the summit invitation. Khrushchev replies, via an aide, that he is still awaiting an answer to his questions and has no intention of replying in writing.

Meeting Adjourns

The Western Big Three adjourn at 5 P. M. The conference that never got under way is at an end. The Western leaders issue a communiqué declaring that because of the "attitude" of Khrushchev it has not been possible to begin summit discussions. The communiqué says of the Western Big Three:

They themselves remain ready to take part in such negotiations at any suitable time in the future.

WEDNESDAY

At a huge, tumultuous press conference at which he is alternately booed and cheered, Khrushchev stages one of the most amazing performances within the memory of Western correspondents. Again flanked by Malinovsky and Gromyko, the Soviet leader pounds the table, hurls insults and epithets at the United States, and shouts with rage during a two-hour and twenty minute session. He calls the actions of the United States—and inferentially those of Eisenhower—"thief-like," "piratical," and "cowardly" and says the warmongers in the Pentagon should be taken "by the scruff of the neck" and given a "good shake."

Khrushchev refers to Eisenhower as a "fishy" friend and heaps ridicule on what he calls the President's offer of a "favor" to call off the over-flights. He threatens "devastating" blows at bases used for United States espionage flights and says Russia is going to sign a peace treaty with East Germany—when, is "our business."

Following the news conference, Gromyko dispatches a cablegram to the U. N. Security Council calling for an urgent meeting to discuss the "aggressive" acts of the U. S. which are creating "a threat to universal peace."

NEW YORK TIMES

22 May 1960

"WEEK IN REVIEW"

THURSDAY

Khrushchev flies to East Berlin and keeps the world in suspense about his plans for an East German peace treaty. Eisenhower, appearing somewhat subdued, is enthusiastically greeted by crowds in Lisbon.

In the U. N. Security Council debate on the Soviet charge is set for this Monday.

FRIDAY

In a speech at a Communist party rally in East Berlin, Khrushchev announces that Russia plans no unilateral moves on West Berlin or East Germany in the immediate future. He says:

The existing situation will apparently have to be preserved till the heads of government meeting, which, it is to be hoped, will take place in six or eight months.

Sensing disappointment among his audience at the announcement, Khrushchev interrupts his interpreter to interpolate the remark that the East Germans should wait "and the matter will get more mature."

Two hundred thousand persons turn out to greet the President on his arrival in Washington. He warns Americans to be watchful for "more irritations" and possibly incidents as a result of the Paris impasse. In London, Macmillan sounds the same theme. The West must be prepared for "new threats and new dangers," he says.

An American C-47 transport, on a flight from Copenhagen to Hamburg with nine persons aboard, is reported down in East Germany, creating concern in the West over possible new Communist protests over border violations.

SATURDAY

Khrushchev welcomed on return to Moscow in reception boycotted by U. S. diplomats.

Soviet authorities in East Germany announce they had "forced down" the C-47 and taken the nine passengers and crew into custody. The U. S. asks the Russians for the immediate release of the nine.

Premier Khrushchev's sharply contradictory performances in Paris and Berlin created equally contradictory reactions throughout the world. The immediate reaction to his Paris behavior was world-wide shock. The general feeling seemed to be that the Soviet leader had dissipated a good case over the U-2 incident by over-playing his hand and wrecking the summit conference. The effect was to rally the allies to the United States' defense, to create sympathy among them for President Eisenhower, and to some extent to get Washington off the hook for its handling of the U-2 incident. Even among the neutral nations concern and criticism over Premier Khrushchev's course temporarily pushed into the background the misgivings over U. S. leadership—misgivings that had been accentuated by Sunday night's alert of U. S. forces.

The Soviet leader's temperate statement in Berlin both allayed much of the fear that had been created and helped him cut to some extent his propaganda losses in Paris. But it also raised the perplexing question of the meaning of his entire performance during the week.

Who Was Responsible?

Chronology of U-2 Incident Traced In Tangled Web of Summit Dispute

By Chalmers M. Roberts
Staff Reporter

Who was responsible for the incredible assortment of conflicting statements and contradictory assertions when the Eisenhower Administration was confronted with the U-2 spy plane crisis?

This is the most immediate question in the tangled web of the U-2 affair and the subsequent collapse of the Summit Conference in Paris. What follows is a detailed examination of the facts about the Administration's handling of the U-2 case.

It should be noted beforehand, however, that there are other important parts to the whole story: The apparent public hardening of American policy toward the Soviet Union prior to the U-2 affair; Soviet

Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's reaction to that hardening; Khrushchev's reactions to the American accounts of the U-2 case; and the internal Soviet pressures on Khrushchev, before and after the spy plane was downed, because of his year-old policy of trying to do business with President Eisenhower.

Whether or not Khrushchev would have scuttled the Summit, had there been no U-2 incident, is not now clear; there are divided opinions in the Administration on that. A good many diplomats do tend to agree with what President Eisenhower said to the congressional leaders yesterday — that Khrushchev may have scuttled the conference because he was under "pressure by the Stalinists," those in Moscow suspicious of any

dealing with the West, "and the Chinese" Communists who have openly disagreed with Khrushchev's policies.

But that question is only indirectly related to the handling of the U-2 affair by the Eisenhower Administration.

The chief figures in the U-2 drama in Washington were President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, Under Secretary C. Douglas Dillon, Central Intelligence Agency chief Allen W. Dulles and White House Press Secretary James C. Hagerty.

It is evident from the record that much of the confusion sprang from the fact that no one acted in supreme authority in directing the Administration's actions.

Here is the chronological
See POLICY, A18, Col. 1

record as far as it is known today:

May 1—The U-2 flight of pilot Francis G. Powers took place on this date because of a clear weather forecast. That forecast also indicated that such good weather probably would not be repeated for some weeks; that is, until after the Summit Conference, then two weeks off. CIA officials say the equipment carried by Powers, including the tiny poison needle, is standard equipment carried by all Strategic Air Command crews. It is designed to help a crewman escape if downed in enemy territory. Powers never was ordered to use the needle to avoid capture; it was for use to avoid torture, if captured, according to CIA officials. The pistol was not for murdering Russians but for shooting small game, it is contended.

Second Flight

The day of Powers' flight, there was a second U-2 flight from Turkey. This was a meteorological flight outside the Soviet Union, the kind of flight the National Aeronautics and Space Administration unwittingly thought all U-2's were making. NASA was, of course, the "cover" for the clandestine flights over the Soviet Union.

These penetrations of Soviet air space had been going on for four years with results highly gratifying to American intelligence officials. There had been a great many of these flights and the Powers mission was not the first designed to cross the Soviet Union. Others had succeeded when he failed.

So detailed were the photographs brought back by the U-2s that at one time the State Department's Policy Planning Staff considered a proposal to show them to Khrushchev. The idea was to use them in an effort to break down his resistance to inspection and control for various disarmament schemes.

The proposal was rejected, however, partially on the grounds that Khrushchev already knew of the flights and that such a move might lead him to make such a public row that they would have to be discontinued.

Cut-Off Planned

CIA officials contend that there was to be a cut-off of U-2 flights before the Summit, that the question was how much time constituted a margin of safety. Nevertheless, the Powers mission was permitted to take place two weeks before the Summit. In his speech on Wednesday the President implied he fully approved of that.

Mr. Eisenhower said that, as to complaints over the timing of the flight so close to the Summit, "there is no time when vigilance can be relaxed." By implication, he meant there was no reason to cancel the flight because of the impending conference with the Russians.

However, this has not always been the President's policy. In September, 1956, in the midst of the Suez crisis negotiations with the Russians as well as the Egyptians—the President did order a halt to the U-2 flights. Then he apparently wanted to avoid an incident which would make negotiation more difficult.

There is no evidence, however, that the President was aware beforehand of this particular flight or that either the State Department or the CIA thought his specific approval necessary. He had delegated authority for the flights, once having approved the entire U-2 scheme following Soviet rejection of his "open skies" plan at the 1955 Geneva Summit conference.

May 14—During this period the CIA and the State Department knew that Powers was missing; they hoped he had crashed and that pilot and plane had left no tell-tale evidence. The initial confusion over the missing plane, as to whether it was Powers or the legitimate meteorological flight in Turkey the same day, was soon cleared up. There is no evidence that the Administration laid out any plan of how to handle the possible disclosures later made by Khrushchev.

May Have Been Misled

The Administration may have been misled into thinking Khrushchev would remain silent because of Soviet action over the expected visit to the United States of the boss of the Soviet Air Force, Air Marshal K. A. Vershinin.

On May 2 the Soviets asked for a 48-hour postponement of the announcement of the visit. But on May 4 they agreed to a joint United States-Soviet announcement and it was made that day. The visit was cancelled on May 13 after Khrushchev's U-2 disclosure.

On May 3 it was announced from Istanbul, Turkey, that a single-engine Air Force plane was missing near Lake Van, not far from the Soviet border. It was described as a high altitude research plane belonging to NASA.

The report said the plane was one of two which had taken off from the United States base at Incirlik near Adana, Turkey, on a weather reconnaissance mission. The other plane returned safely

but the pilot of the missing craft was said to have reported his oxygen equipment was out of order.

Standard Story

This was the standard sort of "cover" story for the missing U-2, issued in the hopes that it would suffice. It was not known here whether Powers' U-2 went down or why. To this date, in fact, there is only Khrushchev's word that it was downed near Sverdlovsk, deep inside the Soviet Union.

May 5 — Khrushchev announced to the Supreme Soviet in Moscow the bare details of the U-2 flight, deliberately (he said later) withholding information which would have let Washington know that Powers was alive and that much of his equipment had been captured intact. He set a trap into which the Eisenhower Administration fell.

In his Wednesday speech, Mr. Eisenhower contended that the "covering statement," as he called it, was imperative "to protect the pilot, his mission and our intelligence processes at a time when the true facts were still undetermined."

On May 5 Secretary Herter was in Athens, en route home from a NATO foreign ministers conference in Turkey. In charge of the State Department was Under Secretary Dillon.

Dillon's Responsibility

Under the President's delegation of authority, it was Dillon's responsibility for what next occurred until Herter's return late on May 6. It was on May 5 and 6 that the Administration allowed itself to be entangled in a series of lies about the U-2.

When newsmen went to Press Secretary Hagerty for comment on Khrushchev's speech, Hagerty was careful to say only that the President did not know of the news story about the speech.

News of the speech arrived here just after the President had left by helicopter for a National Security Council meeting at a secret hideout, part of a civil defense exercise. There is no evidence on whether the President at that meeting discussed what to do about the Khrushchev disclosure. The subsequent record indicates that he left it to Dillon and the State Department.

State Department spokesman Lincoln White, who received his instructions personally from Dillon, said that "it may be" that the plane Khrushchev referred to was the missing so-called NASA aircraft. It was also announced that the President had ordered an immediate inquiry into Khrushchev's accusation.

Trouble Compounded

This semi-lie was aggravated by NASA's press chief, Walter T. Bonney. Unaware that NASA was being used as a "cover" for the spy flights, Bonney said at a press conference that the plane was on a wholly peaceful mission. He gave details of the plane's Adana take-off, its route within Turkey and the pilot's alleged report of his oxygen trouble. The Administration's story thus was that a peaceful flight outside Soviet borders might have by accident transgressed the Soviet-Turkish border.

There is no evidence that the President or Dillon, or anyone else in authority in the Administration, took charge of the whole affair and told NASA to say nothing. There have been subsequent hints from the White House, however, that some such order went out to NASA but was overlooked or disregarded. The record here is not clear.

May 6—In Moscow it was claimed the U-2 was shot down by a rocket on Khrushchev's personal order, but other details still were withheld. However, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko termed the American explanation "nonsense."

"Full Facts" Asked

The State Department said it was asking the "full facts" in Moscow. White, still acting under Dillon's orders, declared that "there was absolutely no—no—deliberate attempt to violate the Soviet airspace." The lie thus was compounded.

Around dinner time Herter arrived home from Greece to take charge of the State Department.

The strongest evidence that the handling of the U-2 affair was left by the President to the State Department—first to Dillon, then to Herter—comes from Vice President Richard M. Nixon. On a May 15 television show Nixon gave this explanation, putting part of the blame for the fumbling on the insistent demand of newsmen for the facts:

"Now, let's look at the problem with which our people in the State Department were confronted when this information developed. They did not know at the outset what the Soviet Union knew. They did not know that the pilot had been recovered and that they had obtained information from him or otherwise which made it im-

perative we acknowledge that these flights had taken place.

Alternative Question

"Now, some would say then, well, why then didn't we keep our mouths shut and say nothing and wait until we found out what they knew?"

"And here again we have the problem of the open society. We have newsmen in Washington. The newsmen descended upon the State Department and other officials in great numbers. They had a right to. And they asked for the information. What about this? And, so under the circumstances, it was felt that the best thing to do was to engage in effect in what usually is engaged in where so-called espionage activities are undertaken, evasive actions—evasive actions, so as to protect the pilot in the event that he had been captured and also evasive actions so as to give the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, for example, an opportunity to accept the consequences of this flight without admitting as he has had to admit that it had been conducted for espionage purposes."

Later in the same program Nixon added that "they had to make a snap decision at the moment and it proved that—it turned out that that decision was wrong and in these kinds of activities, we, of course, want to try to avoid mistakes if we can."

References Missing

Nowhere in the three-and-a-half-hour television program did Nixon refer to any presidential direction in the U-2 crisis, other than his approval of the flights some years earlier. Nor was there any reference to his own part in the affair. Nixon, of course, sits in the National Security Council.

Nixon did say that he was "pry" to the U-2 reconnaissance policy "and I do endorse it." He also said that "I knew about this flight..."

On Friday afternoon, May 6, the President went to his Gettysburg, Pa., farm for a weekend of rest and golf. He did not return to Washington until Sunday, May 8 but he was in telephone communication with Herter during the weekend. Hagerty, who accompanied the President to Gettysburg, also talked by phone to Herter.

May 7 — Khrushchev, in a

second Moscow speech on the U-2, disclosed the pilot was alive and talking and that much of his equipment had been captured intact. Khrushchev showed the Supreme Soviet photos taken from the U-2 of Soviet military installations, and he detailed the plane's equipment.

Genuine Information

American officials, who received the speech in the morning, Washington time, knew Khrushchev was using information that was genuine and that some of it could have come only from Powers himself.

Khrushchev quoted Hagerty as saying that "the President, in his opinion, knew nothing about the incident involving the American plane. I fully admit (said Khrushchev) that the President did not know that a plane was sent beyond the Soviet frontier and did not return."

The Khrushchev speech resulted in a series of all-day conferences in which the chief figures were Herter, Dillon, Allen Dulles and a number of lesser State Department officials, including Herter's adviser on Soviet affairs, Charles E. Bohlen.

Out of this came a unanimous decision to tell the truth—but not all the truth. The dinner-hour State Department statement said that the flight referred to by Khrushchev "was probably undertaken by an unarmed civilian U-2 plane..."

Flight Justified

The flight was justified on the grounds of the need "to obtain information now concealed behind the Iron Curtain" to lessen the dangers of a surprise attack on the free world in general and the United States in particular.

On the critical issue of who was responsible for the flight, however, the statement lied. It said that "as a result of the inquiry ordered by the President it has been established that insofar as the authorities in Washington are concerned there was no authorization for any such flight as described by Mr. Khrushchev."

In making this statement, chiefly the decision of Secretary Herter, those involved were added by a number of considerations. They felt that Khrushchev had the evidence and therefore an admission

was essential despite the earlier lies. But they were trapped in a dilemma on the issue of responsibility. They decided it was best to avoid admitting any responsibility by President Eisenhower even at the cost of accepting the resultant impression that Washington's control was so lax that American pilots around the world could go off on their own on a mission that might provoke a war.

Dulles Willing

During the State Department deliberations Allen Dulles made it clear that he, as head of CIA, was prepared to take full responsibility for the flight, that if the Administration wanted to pin the blame on him to avoid blaming the President, he would agree. But this idea was not accepted as being practical in view of Khrushchev's disclosures.

Herter read the draft statement on the phone to the President in Gettysburg. He approved it without changing a word.

In part, at least, Herter's decision to tell the lie that no one in Washington authorized the flight also was based on the slim hope that somehow Khrushchev would accept it. The Secretary and his aides had noted Khrushchev's acceptance of what he had taken as Hagerty's disclaimer of any Eisenhower responsibility.

May 8—While the world assessed the seemingly incredible American admission that the U-2 had indeed been on an espionage flight, President Eisenhower returned to Washington and met with Herter at the White House.

Notes to Britain, France

The same day Khrushchev sent notes to Britain and France about the forthcoming Summit Conference. In them he complained about the U-2 but gave no indication it would be used to wreck the conference as was to be the case.

By now Hagerty was alarmed at the implications of the admission statement, implications that the President did not know what was going on. He was insistent to Herter that this should somehow be eliminated. It is not clear whether the President said the same thing to Herter but if he did there would seem

to have been no reason for Hagerty to do so.

May 9—After another State Department conference, Herter put out a statement in his name saying that "penetration" by the U-2s of the Soviet Union had been going on for four years, that this had been done by presidential orders "since the beginning of his Administration" in order to gather intelligence. But Herter added that "specific missions of these unarmed civilian aircraft have not been subject to presidential authorization." This, at last, appeared to be the truth.

Unaware of Implication

This was the statement which left the implication that such U-2 flights would be continued over the Soviet Union. But there is reason to believe that none of those involved at State Department was conscious of any such implication when they drafted the statement. They took the view, shared by the CIA, that the U-2 setup now was "a blown agent" to be discarded, that other intelligence gathering methods would continue, however.

Nonetheless the implication was there and neither State nor the White House did anything to correct it until the President himself told Khrushchev in Paris a full week later that "these flights were suspended after the recent incident and are not to be resumed."

The President said Wednesday he wanted no public announcement until he met Khrushchev in Paris. American officials also claimed the flight suspension was ordered the previous Thursday, May 12, which is at cross-purposes with the claim that no implication of further flights was contained in Herter's May 9 statement.

Nixon Unaware

Indeed, Nixon in his May 15 television appearance seemed unaware that the flights had been cancelled. He then said: "The first responsibility of the President of the United States . . . is to protect the security of this country and of free peoples everywhere from the devastation that would result from a surprise attack. Now, that is why these flights were made in the first place. The President of the United States has fully stated its position

may have to continue in the

Herter and Dulles appeared on May 9 before a specially arranged closed-door Congressional leadership meeting. To at least some of those present Herter left the clear implication that the flights would continue.

May 10 — The Soviet news agency, Tass, described Herter's statement as "a frank attempt to legalize and justify violation of the state frontiers of other nations for espionage purposes." A Soviet note to the United States, avoided blaming President Eisenhower personally but, in referring to the May 7 statement by State, said it did "not correspond to reality." It charged that the U-2 flights "are carried on with the sanction of the Government of the United States of America."

Welcome Doubted

May 11 — At an exhibition in Moscow of the U-2 wreckage and equipment, Khrushchev said Herter's May 9 statement made him doubt "Our earlier conclusion" that the President himself did not know of the flights. He said he doubted the President would be welcome in Russia during his scheduled June visit there.

When asked whether the U-2 incident would come up at the Summit Conference, Khrushchev replied: "It is already the subject of worldwide discussion. Therefore I believe there is no need to put it on the discussion schedule at the Summit Conference."

The same day at his press conference here President Eisenhower took full responsibility for the U-2 flights, said nothing to counter the implication that they would continue, remarked that "no one wants another Pearl Harbor."

May 12-14 — During this period Khrushchev went to Paris a day early, arriving on Saturday, May 14. Herter arrived on May 13 but there was no United States-Soviet contact. On the 13th the Soviet Union sent protest notes to Norway, Pakistan and Turkey warning against further use of their territory for such missions as those of the U-2 which Khrushchev had claimed took off from Pakistan with the expectation of landing in Norway.

On the 12th the United States sent a note to Moscow which said the United States

about the U-2 incident in the May 9 Herter statement.

By now President Eisenhower's responsibility for the U-2 flights, if not for the specific Powers mission, had been firmly established on the public record.

May 15—The President arrived in Paris just before Khrushchev's call on French President de Gaulle. The President considered two possible moves in this final day before the Summit Conference was to open. To ask for a bilateral meeting with Khrushchev and to announce publicly that no more flights would be made.

But the President decided against either step. He did so chiefly on the basis of de Gaulle's report of the hard stand taken by Khrushchev in their talk that morning. His aides told him they deduced from Khrushchev's words with de Gaulle that the Soviet leader had come to Paris bound by a prior Moscow decision by the ruling Presidium, that he therefore could not be swayed by either suggested Eisenhower move.

Allen Statement

On this same day in Washington George V. Allen, chief of the U. S. Information Agency, said on a television show that Herter "has not said that we are going to continue to fly" U-2 missions, that "he hasn't said one way or another." This statement surprised State Department officials who now say Allen was talking entirely on his own, that he had consulted nobody in advance.

May 16—At the only Paris confrontation between President Eisenhower and Khrushchev, the Soviet leader said the United States had "torpedoed" the conference. He demanded that the President apologize for the flights, call off further flights and punish those responsible for Powers' mission. These were the same demands of which he had informed de Gaulle the day before. He charged the President with making "treachery" the basis of his policy toward the Soviet Union.

To this the President responded by terming Khrushchev's demands an "ultimatum" which "would never be acceptable to the United States." He also told Khrushchev that U-2 flights had been suspended and would not be resumed. The two men parted in anger. The Summit had collapsed before it had begun.

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so as to prevent their happening in the future?

Mr. MONRONEY. I agree completely with the Senator. Democracy can only purify, correct, and eliminate future error by constructive criticism. The only ones who can properly do this—I think the only ones who should do this—are the opposition. It is the duty of the opposition at least to point the finger at the need. This we have done. Our leading Democrats are criticized in the most intemperate language for pointing the finger at some things which the newspapers in the United States have universally decried as blunders.

As Governor Stevens said:

We cannot sweep this whole sorry mess under the rug in the name of national unity. We cannot and must not. Too much is at stake. Rather we must try to help the American people understand the nature of the crisis, to see how we got into this predicament, how we can get out of it, and how we get on with the business of improving relations and mutual confidence and building a safer, saner world in the nuclear age.

This is the day of loyal opposition.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MONRONEY. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, ask unanimous consent that chronological statement of the facts with respect to the U-2 incident be printed in the RECORD, in support very completely of the position taken by the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma on the floor of the Senate.

Mr. MONRONEY. Does the Senator have that information prepared?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I have the information.

Mr. MONRONEY. I am delighted to have it printed in the RECORD.

Mr. President, I welcome this information, because it is very important if we are going to face this program like men instead of like children. We should not try to say, in the name of national unity, that we must continue to tolerate great, tragic errors which go on uncorrected.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. MONRONEY. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The article to which I refer was written by the Associated Press, and was published May 17, 1960. The headline is "Chronological Account of U.S. Reports on U-2."

Mr. MONRONEY. The Senator says it is an Associated Press article?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Yes.

Mr. MONRONEY. I think we can all trust the Associated Press not to editorialize on behalf of the Democratic Party.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator. I again congratulate the Senator.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF U.S. REPORTS ON U-2

Following is a chronological account of conflicting statements and comments about the spy plane incident as made by administration spokesmen and agencies.

May 6 (5 days after the flight), an announcement by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration:

"One of NASA's U-2 research airplanes, in use since 1956 in a continuing program to study gust-meterological conditions found at high altitudes, has been missing since about 9 o'clock Sunday morning, when its pilot reported he was having oxygen difficulties over the Lake Van, Turkey, area.

"If the pilot continued to suffer lack of oxygen, the path of the airplane from the last reported position would be impossible to determine. If the airplane was on automatic pilot, it is likely it would have continued along its northeasterly course.

"The pilot, as are all pilots used on NASA's program of upper atmosphere research with the U-2 airplane, is a civilian employed by the Lockheed Aircraft Corp., builders of the airplane.

May 6: Comment by State Department Spokesman Lincoln White at a news conference:

QUESTION. "Has there been any change in the orders under which the planes continue to operate in the vicinity of the Soviet border?"

Mr. White: "There is no change to be made. This gentleman (the pilot) informed us that he was having difficulty with his oxygen equipment. Now our assumption is that the man blacked out. There was absolutely no—no—deliberate attempt to violate the Soviet airspace."

May 7: Statement by the State Department:

"As previously announced, it was known that a U-2 plane was missing. As a result of the inquiry ordered by the President it has been established that insofar as the authorities in Washington are concerned there was no authorization for any such flight as described by Mr. Khrushchev.

"Nevertheless it appears that in endeavoring to obtain information now concealed behind the Iron Curtain a flight over Soviet territory was probably undertaken by an unarmed civilian U-2 plane.

The "necessity for such activities as measures for legitimate national defense is enhanced by the excessive secrecy practiced by the Soviet Union in contrast to the free world."

"It is in relation to the danger of surprise attack that planes of the type of unarmed civilian U-2 aircraft have made flights along the frontiers of the free world for the past 4 years.

May 7: Comment by White House Press Secretary James C. Hagerty when asked about a report that Mr. Eisenhower has ordered a halt to all further spy flights over Russia:

"I know of no such order."

May 7: Statement by Secretary of State Herter:

"In accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, the President has put into effect since the beginning of his administration directives to gather by every possible means the information of required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for their defense.

"Under these directives programs have been developed and put into operation which have included extensive aerial surveillance by unarmed civilian aircraft, normally of a peripheral nature but on occasion by penetration.

"Specific missions of these unarmed civilian aircraft have not been subject to Presidential authorization."

May 9: Comment by Mr. White at second news conference:

Mr. White: "As this statement says, it is incumbent upon us to take any measures we can to guard against surprise attack."

Question: "You realize that a normal interpretation of this would be that we intend to continue?"

White: "Well, I will leave it to your interpretation."

May 12: President Eisenhower said at his news conference:

"No one wants another Pearl Harbor. This means that we must have knowledge of military forces and preparations around the world, especially those capable of massive surprise attack. The safety of the whole free world demands this."

"We do not use our Army, Navy, or Air Force for this purpose, first to avoid any possibility of the use of force in connection with these activities, and second because our military forces, for obvious reasons, cannot be given latitude under broad directives but must be kept under strict control in every detail.

"The normal agencies of our Government are unaware of these specific activities or of the special efforts to conceal them.

"How should we view all this activity? It is a distasteful but vital necessity."

May 12: U.S. note replying to Russia's protest:

"In its note, the Soviet Government has stated that the collection of intelligence about the Soviet Union by American aircraft is a 'calculated policy' of the United States.

"The U.S. Government does not deny that it has pursued such a policy for purely defensive purposes. What it emphatically does deny is that this policy has any aggressive intent, or that the unarmed U-2 flight of May 1 was undertaken in an effort to prejudice the success of the forthcoming meeting of the heads of government in Paris or to return the state of American-Soviet relations to the worst times of the cold war.

"Indeed, it is the Soviet Government's treatment of this case which, if anything, may raise questions about its intention in respect to these matters."

May 15: Comments by George V. Allen, Director of the U.S. Information Agency, in replying to questions on a television panel show (ABC's "College News Conference"):

Mr. Allen: "I will say that I know that the spokesman of the State Department who gave out the information was acting in entirely good faith when he said that it was a weather plane.

"There has been a great misunderstanding that I would like to correct today. Mr. Herter, the Secretary of State, has not said that we are going to continue to fly. He has said that there is an obligation and a responsibility on the part of the Government of the United States and of the free world to try to obtain information to guard against surprise attack but he has not said that we are going to continue to fly. He hasn't said one way or another."

May 15: Vice President Nixon, answering questions on the television program "Open End":

"There is never a right time to make one of these flights if you're going to get caught.

"The plus is this. You realize that this flight clearly demonstrates the feasibility of the 'open skies' proposal of the President.

"This flight demonstrates that unarmed planes can take photographs without causing any damage, any harm at all to commercial aviation or the national security of the country over which the flights are made."

May 16: Mr. Eisenhower's remarks at summit meeting in Paris:

"We pointed out that these activities (plane flights) had no aggressive intent but rather were to assure the safety of the United States and the free world against surprise attack by a power which boasts of its ability to devastate the United States and other countries by missiles armed with atomic warheads.

"There is in the Soviet statement an evident misapprehension on one key point. It alleges that the United States has, through official statements, threatened

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continued overflights. In point of fact, these flights were suspended after the recent incident and are not to be resumed."

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield briefly?

Mr. MONRONEY. I am happy to yield.

Mr. CLARK. It occurs to me—and I ask my friend from Oklahoma if he agrees with me—that this would be a good place to ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a series of eight questions concerning the chronology of events about which the Senator from Missouri has spoken. These questions were asked by a number of Members of the House of Representatives of President Eisenhower. In my judgment, these eight questions go to the heart of this situation. I commend my friends in the other body for taking this action. I ask the Senator to request that the questions be printed.

Mr. MONRONEY. I wish we could have the names of all those asking the questions. I think already some 35 or 40 brilliant young Members of the other body have signed the statement. Does the Senator know the names of those who have signed?

Mr. CLARK. I know that Representative CHESTER BOWLES and Representative JAMES ROOSEVELT are among the ones who have signed, but I do not have the names of the others.

Mr. MONRONEY. Representative METCALF is another.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the questions be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the questions were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

COPY OF QUESTIONS ASKED BY GROUP OF HOUSE LIBERAL MEMBERS IN LETTER TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER ON MAY 20, 1960

We are distressed over the collapse of the summit meeting and the damage to our prestige and leadership in the world. The cause of world peace has been endangered. We believe that Congress and the people must ask the following questions. We believe it is the administration's responsibility to answer these questions:

1. Why was the U-2 flight over the Soviet Union ordered just prior to the summit meeting?
2. When the U-2 incident became public, why was a series of contradictory and false statements issued by administration officials—and who was responsible?
3. Why did the administration order a worldwide military alert from Paris on the eve of the summit?
4. Why did the administration first indicate that as a matter of national policy it would continue manned flights over Russia, and then reverse itself and say that it had ordered them discontinued?
5. Was it necessary to compromise the announced peaceful role of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) by using it as a cover for an espionage operation?
6. Why was there no coordination between the agency responsible for the U-2 flight and the agency responsible for our diplomatic functions?
7. Why did the President announce in advance that as our Chief of State he might return to Washington before the conference ended?
8. Has the traditional American policy of civilian supremacy over the military been impaired?

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MONRONEY. I yield to the Senator from Texas.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. I desire to associate myself with the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma and to congratulate the Senator upon the clarity of his remarks, and his service to this body and to the American people by answering the scurrilous attack made within these walls today upon two great Americans. The very party which calls for unity is doing everything it can, by this type of scurrilous attack, to assure there will not be any unity.

The attack made upon these two great Americans was a typical example of partisan Republican so-called bipartisan ship.

The distinguished Senator from Oklahoma has clearly exposed the fallacy of the attack.

Mr. MONRONEY. I thank my distinguished colleague.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MONRONEY. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Maine.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I cannot resist suggesting some additional documentation for the points the distinguished Senator has been making.

Mr. MONRONEY. I would welcome the information.

Mr. MUSKIE. On this past Sunday I happened to be in Des Moines, Iowa. I purchased a copy of the Des Moines Sunday Register, for May 22, 1960. The lead editorial had the following to say with respect to one of the distinguished Democrats who has been referred to so vehemently this morning:

But the President knows also that a period of harsh questioning and some political maneuvering is ahead in this election year. The speeches made Thursday night by Adlai E. Stevenson, the titular head of the Democratic Party, and by U.S. Representative CHESTER BOWLES, an adviser on foreign policy to presidential candidate JOHN KENNEDY, make this very evident.

The views and criticism of such responsible and well-informed leaders as Stevenson and BOWLES are welcome. The administration's handling of foreign policy is a proper matter for discussion at any time, and especially during a presidential campaign. Restraint, of course, is called for.

Mr. Stevenson did exercise restraint in his talk. It was made after he had earlier signed a telegram, along with Senators Johnson and Fulbright and House Speaker Rayburn, sent to Mr. Eisenhower in Paris. This telegram was intended to make it clear to Soviet Premier Khrushchev that he could not expect concessions from a Democratic administration that would not be made by a Republican administration.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed in the RECORD in its entirety at this point.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Des Moines Sunday Register, May 22, 1960]

IKW'S SAD HOMECOMING

It was a sad, not a triumphal, homecoming for President Eisenhower when he returned to Washington Friday. His primary goal in his last year in office has been to bring about some easing of tensions between

the Soviet Union and the United States, some tangible progress toward agreements that would end the cold war and make a war of annihilation impossible. These hopes are now crushed by what happened at the summit conference in Paris.

The sympathy of all Americans, Republicans and Democrats alike, is extended to Mr. Eisenhower at this time. This is the meaning of the big reception he received in Washington and of such heart-warming events as a "Welcome Home Eisenhower" day in far-off Oelwein, Iowa. It is not, of course, rejoicing over the failure of the summit conference.

The President can be assured, we feel certain, that there is unity in the United States on basic goals, of resistance to Communist aggression and of a desire, as Mr. Eisenhower said in Portugal, to work with other members of the United Nations and our partners in NATO "in the common cause of peace and justice for all men."

But the President knows also that a period of harsh questioning and some political maneuvering is ahead in this election year. The speeches made Thursday night by Adlai E. Stevenson, the titular head of the Democratic Party, and by U.S. Representative Chester Bowles, an adviser on foreign policy to Presidential candidate John Kennedy, make this very evident.

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Mr. Stevenson did not express the view, as had Senator Kennedy, that the President of the United States should have apologized to Khrushchev about the U-2 spy incident. He said Khrushchev had made an "impossible" demand on Mr. Eisenhower. He also pinned the blame for the wrecking of the summit conference on Khrushchev—but contended that the administration by its "carelessness and mistakes" had made it very easy for the Soviet Premier to wreck the conference. Mr. BOWLES took a similar view: he called for "constructive" debate and a reexamination of the administration's record on foreign relations.

There is a very good reason to believe that Khrushchev would have wrecked the summit conference if there had been no U-2 incident and its aftermath of diplomatic blundering. Just why, when he had worked so strenuously to get a conference, is uncertain. The most likely theory is that Khrushchev had finally realized that he couldn't get concessions he wanted from the West on the Berlin and Germany issues. Pressures from Red China and from Communist rivals in Russia are other possible explanations.

But mistakes were made by the administration in its handling of the U-2 affair. The explanation for these mistakes, which may or may not be made in the near future, may clarify the situation somewhat. The mistakes indicate the need, as James Reston points out in his article on today's editorial page, for studying the relationship between the White House and the CIA, whether the National Security Council system is functioning properly and whether there is a failure to coordinate our activities with those of our NATO allies.